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INTRODUCTION 
Originalism is usually called a theory of interpretation, a par-
ticular way to read a text. Best understood, though, originalism 
is much more than that. It’s a theory of our law: a particular 
way to understand where our law comes from, what it re-
quires, and how it can be changed. 
This view starts with a common assumption of legal systems, 
that the law stays the same until it’s lawfully changed. A stat-
ute that’s hundreds of years old can still be good law today, 
simply because it was properly enacted at some earlier time 
and has never been amended or repealed. If you start with an 
old statute book and add everything enacted since, you should 
end up with the code as it stands today. 
To an originalist, what’s true of old statutes is also true of 
our old Constitution, and indeed of our old law generally. 
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Whatever rules of law we had at the Founding, we still have 
today, unless something legally relevant happened to change 
them. Our law happens to consist of their law, the Founders’ 
law, including lawful changes made along the way. Preserving 
the meaning of the Founders’ words is important, but it’s not 
an end in itself. It’s just a means to preserving the content of 
the Founders’ law. 
Not everyone agrees with this picture, of course; not even all 
“originalists.” People use the word “originalism” in lots of dif-
ferent ways. But treating originalism as a claim about law, not 
just interpretation, gets us past some of the debates that have 
occupied the field—and it helps us see the way to more fruitful 
areas for agreement. 
At the moment, most defenses of originalism fall into two 
camps, which we can call “normative” and “conceptual.” 
Normative defenses portray certain interpretive methods as 
good ideas (because they constrain judges, promote democra-
cy, and so on). These defenses might be right or wrong; more 
importantly, the good ideas they defend might not be reflected 
in our law. Maybe American law, as it currently exists, doesn’t 
constrain judges or promote democracy as much as it ought to. 
If originalism is just a law reform project, it loses much of its 
rhetorical force. Conceptual defenses, by contrast, start from 
incontestable legal assumptions (say, that the Constitution is 
law). They then argue, on philosophical grounds, that the Con-
stitution’s meaning just is its original meaning (intention, un-
derstanding, public meaning, etc.). But the law doesn’t have to 
reflect good philosophy any more than good policy. So it might 
be that our legal system, like Canada’s or France’s, reads our 
constitutional text some other way or incorporates some other 
sources of law. 
In other words, to know what to make of these defenses, we 
need to know whether (and to what extent) originalism is al-
ready part of American law. This inquiry points the way toward 
what we could call “positive” defenses—claims that originalism, 
as a matter of social fact and legal practice, is actually endorsed 
by our positive law. In academic circles, positive defenses are 
relatively rare; indeed, they’re almost unheard of. One promi-
nent originalist recently argued that “[n]o one, as of yet, has 
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made a strong case for concluding the original meaning is the 
law”—or has “even tried [to do so] in an extended article.”1 
This Article tries to fill that gap. Modern originalism may 
have gotten its start by critiquing, not affirming, everyday legal 
practice. But these critiques were founded on deeper features 
of American constitutional law—which is why they accused 
judges and other officials of departing from the law rather than 
following it. What matters for our understanding of the law 
isn’t just everyday practice, but the premises that are implicit in 
our legal arguments, the claims about the structure of our law 
that we’re willing publicly to accept and defend. At that level, 
there’s a clear originalist strain in our legal thought, one best 
captured by viewing originalism as a theory of legal change. 
American constitutional law cares about genealogy. One useful 
way of getting at the nature of a constitutional challenge is to ask 
about the challenged practice, “When do you think it became un-
constitutional?”2—with the range of acceptable answers stretching 
from the Founding through yesterday. If the law was X at the 
Founding but is supposed to be Y today, the natural follow-up 
question is what happened in between—and why whatever hap-
pened (an amendment, a statute, a shift in custom or usage) was 
legally capable of making that change. Almost every legal system 
distinguishes authorized changes like these from the unauthor-
ized changes that happen when society simply abandons or de-
parts from some preexisting rule of law. But a distinctive feature 
of the American legal system is that it fixes a particular starting 
date—an origin, a Founding—separating the changes that don’t 
need legal authorization from those that do. Americans don’t 
think that we’re living in a Fifth Republic, the way the French do, 
but rather in the same Republic we started with. 
This intuition is the core of originalism, viewed as a theory of 
legal change. What originalism requires of legal change is that it 
                                                                                                         
 1. Mike Rappaport, Is Originalism the Law?: The Law Reform Criticism, LIBR. L. & 
LIBERTY (May 30, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/05/30/is-originalism-
the-law-the-law-reform-criticism/ [http://perma.cc/S9VA-B7SH]. For a few steps in 
this direction, see Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal 
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253 (2014); William Baude, Is Originalism Our 
Law?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Seman-
tic Originalism 134–49 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07-
24, 2008), http://ssrn.com/id=1120244 [http://perma.cc/9ZAZ-PFVE]. 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (emphasis added). 
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be, well, legal; that it be lawful, that it be done according to law. 
This is a requirement of procedure, not substance. It makes 
originalism a “big tent,” potentially allowing a wide variety of 
legal changes (judicial precedents, liquidation by practice, and so 
on) depending on how the law stood at the time. The originalist 
claim is that each change in our law since the Founding needs a 
justification framed in legal terms, and not just social or political 
ones. To put it another way, originalists believe that the Ameri-
can legal system hasn’t yet departed (even a little bit) from the 
Founders’ law in the way that the colonies threw off the British 
yoke or the states got rid of the Articles of Confederation. If this 
sounds implausible to you, then that may be a perfectly good 
reason not to be an originalist. But this Article suggests that it 
may be more plausible than you think. 
This theory also produces a version of originalism that might 
be particularly attractive to those who already consider them-
selves originalists. What’s important about the Constitution of 
1788 isn’t what it said, but what it did: the legal rules it added to 
the American corpus juris, the contribution (to use Mark Green-
berg’s phrase) it made to the preexisting body of law.3 Whatever 
the Constitution added to the law, it added at the time of its en-
actment. To find out the law that the Constitution made, the rel-
evant way to read the document’s text would be according to the 
rules of the time, legal and otherwise, for turning enacted text 
into law. If that version needs a label, we could call it “original-
law originalism”: the view that the Constitution should be read 
according to its original legal content, whatever that might have 
been. (Why else look to the text, if not to find the law that it pro-
duced? Why be more “originalist” than the Founders, or more 
Catholic than the Pope?) Viewed in these terms, debates be-
tween originalists and nonoriginalists are really positive debates 
about the sources of our current law; disputes among different 
schools of originalists are really historical disputes about the 
content of the law at the Founding. 
Thinking about originalism this way helps redefine the rela-
tionship between law and history. If originalism is based on our 
rules for legal change, then it isn’t just about recovering the 
meaning of ancient texts, a project for philologists and histori-
                                                                                                         
 3 . Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the 
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE 
IN THE LAW 217, 219 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
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ans. Instead, it’s about determining the content of our law, today, 
in part by recovering Founding-era doctrine. That means learn-
ing some history, but it also means exercising legal judgment, 
the kind we hire lawyers for. (In the same way, if we want to 
learn the law of some foreign country, we ask lawyers with rele-
vant expertise, not just ethnographers or sociologists.) Doing 
originalist research requires some specialized techniques, but so 
does chasing down an old chain of title. As a theory of legal 
change, originalism is just ordinary lawyer’s work. 
This Article isn’t intended as a once-and-for-all defense of 
originalism, much less this original-law version thereof. In-
stead, the goal is simply to clear away some theoretical under-
brush, sketching out the different positions, and hopefully 
pushing scholars toward more productive areas of debate. Both 
originalists and nonoriginalists need to show their jurispruden-
tial cards. Is our law really the Founders’ law? If not, how is it 
different? When did the two diverge, and do we accept that 
divergence all the way down? To be a nonoriginalist, on this 
Article’s view, is to say of some new rule: “Maybe Rule X 
wasn’t lawfully adopted; maybe it can’t be defended under 
preexisting law; but I’m okay with that, and so is America.” 
Originalists can say that about the Constitution itself, but not of 
anything invented since. What do you say it about, and why do 
you think it’s true? 
American law might be originalist in nature, but then again it 
might not. Which view is right depends on facts about society 
today, not two hundred years ago. This Article merely argues 
that, if it is true, the claim that we adhere to the Founders’ law 
is the best reason to be an originalist—and, if it’s false, the best 
reason not to. 
I. ORIGINALISM AND POSITIVE LAW 
“Originalism” means lots of things to lots of people.4 To most 
people, though, originalism is a theory about how to interpret the 
Constitution’s text,5 which they defend in one of two ways. Some 
                                                                                                         
 4. See Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary 
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 32 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHAL-
LENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 70, 71. 
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originalists rely on broad normative arguments, citing values like 
popular sovereignty,6 liberty,7 or public welfare.8 If we can better 
serve these values by enforcing the Constitution’s original mean-
ing, as opposed to some other meaning, then we should do so. 
Others think originalism follows from conceptual truths about the 
right way to read legal documents—or even all written texts in 
general. If, for example, written texts always mean whatever their 
authors intended them to mean, then the same is true of the Con-
stitution; any other reading is simply mistaken.9 
Neither defense, though, is fully persuasive. Each depends 
on assumptions that aren’t really about values or meanings, 
but about the content of our law. Whatever interpretive meth-
od we might prefer as a matter of policy, we still need to know 
whether judges and officials can act on that preference, or 
whether their legal obligations point the other way. And what-
ever our philosophical commitments about interpretation, we 
still need to know whether (and to what extent) the document 
we’re interpreting is legally authoritative. 
In other words, we have to deal with the content of the law 
anyway. If so, maybe we should make that all we have to deal 
with—treating originalism not as a normative or conceptual 
matter, but as a legal one. 
A. Normative Defenses of Originalism 
One common way to defend originalism is to argue that it 
achieves some normative goal. The first modern originalists 
                                                                                                         
 6. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 154 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 
1444–46 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–119 (rev. ed. 2014). Barnett also advances a conceptual 
defense of public-meaning originalism, see id. at 391–94, which runs alongside his 
theory of legitimacy, see id. at 119. 
 8. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION 2 (2013). 
 9. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speak-
ing?”: Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 
969 (2004); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 539, 539–40 (2013); Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE 
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 87; Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 139–40 (2010); Paul F. Campos, A Text Is Just A Text, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 327 (1996); Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once 
More, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 99, 101. 
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often presented their theory as the only way to reconcile judi-
cial review with democracy.10 Some modern originalists do the 
same,11 while others focus on popular sovereignty,12 individual 
liberty,13 or public welfare generally.14 If they’re right, then to 
the extent we value these things, we ought to be originalists, 
too. Put much too simply, we could state the normative defense 
as follows: 
 (N1) If something would be a good idea, we should do it. 
 (N2) Following the Constitution’s original meaning would 
be a good idea. 
 (N3) We should follow the Constitution’s original meaning. 
Many nonoriginalists reject this argument at step two. Maybe 
the original meaning isn’t a good idea; maybe it’s actually lousy.15 
Or maybe it’s better on some counts and worse on others, which 
means we’ll have to decide among various normative goals. 
The real problem for originalists, though, is at step one. 
There are lots of good ideas in the world, like reforming health 
care or fixing the tax code. But the fact that they’re good ideas 
doesn’t make them part of the law—or make it another good 
idea for judges and officials to go ahead and implement them 
on their own. The same goes for originalism. If these normative 
arguments are really calls to change the law, that’d undercut 
many of the intuitions on which originalists commonly rely. 
Originalists don’t usually describe themselves as doing law 
reform, or as members of one more interest group trying to im-
plement its agenda through the courts. (If anything, it’s a staple 
of originalist rhetoric to condemn “legislating from the 
bench.”) Originalism as a policy program, even a really good 
one, isn’t what many originalists are looking for. 
                                                                                                         
 10. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 
U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). 
 11. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 223, 232–33. 
 12. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 6; Lash, supra note 6. 
 13. See BARNETT, supra note 7. 
 14. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 8. 
 15. See generally Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 
(1990) (critiquing originalist arguments). 
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1. Originalism as a Good Idea 
Suppose there were a knock-down argument, on your favorite 
normative theory, that originalism is the best way of reading the 
Constitution’s text. The payoff of an argument like that, of identi-
fying a “best way” of reading the text, is that it might lead you to 
particular legal outcomes: whether the President has a removal 
power,16 whether there’s an individual right to bear arms,17 and so 
on. But in real life, you can’t get there from here. The fact that one 
method is normatively better than others doesn’t mean that the 
rules produced by that method are actually part of our law.18 
As Brian Leiter notes, one thing most legal theorists agree on—
especially those known as “legal positivists”—is that “what the 
law is and what the law ought to be are separate questions.”19 If 
we want to know what the law is, whether in a foreign country or 
the United States, we have to see how that society operates; “what 
counts as law in any society is fundamentally a matter of social 
fact.”20 Experts disagree about which facts actually matter—which 
people in a society have to hold which customs, conventions, be-
liefs, norms, and so on, for something to be the law.21 (Does law 
depend on the practices of officials, the understandings of bench 
and bar, the conventions of ordinary people, . . . ?) 
If social facts are what matter, though, one thing that likely 
doesn’t matter is the goodness of a proposed rule (or method of 
discovering the rules)—unless perhaps the social facts say it 
                                                                                                         
 16. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 17. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 18. This Article uses “rules” in a very capacious sense, referring to any consid-
erations that might “screen[] off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive de-
cisionmaker would otherwise take into account.” Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 
YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988). That includes precise commands, flexible standards, 
value-based principles, forgiving guidelines, orders, norms, plans, and any other 
kind of instructions the law might potentially convey. 
 19. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analy-
sis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355, 
356 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). 
 20. Id. at 356; accord Leslie Green, Introduction to H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW, at xv (3d ed. 2012); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule 
of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726 
(2006). 
 21. Compare, e.g., HART, supra note 20 (taking one particular view), and SCOTT J. 
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (taking another). See generally Adler, supra note 20 (de-
scribing the debate). 
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should.22 Maybe our law, as an empirical matter, is just less de-
mocracy-promoting, liberty-protecting, or welfare-enhancing 
than we’d like. Canada and many other countries are said to be 
nonoriginalist, after all.23 How do we know we’re not like them? 
Originalism usually comes across as a restorative project, one 
that rescues the true law from subsequent developments that 
have obscured it. That might mean reversing an occasional mis-
taken precedent, but only to apply the actual law in its place. 
This picture assumes that the rules that originalism generates 
(about removal powers, rights to bear arms, and so on) are in 
some sense already the law—that, despite appearances, there’s 
still something here to vindicate. Normative arguments might 
show why the issue matters, but the legal case is already won.24 
Yet if American law, like Canadian law, really is nonoriginal-
ist, then the normative arguments for originalism are actually 
arguments for law reform—calls to depart from today’s law, 
not to apply it. That the departure might resemble some past 
state of affairs doesn’t make it any less of a departure. (No mat-
ter how good his normative arguments, a latter-day Tory hop-
ing to restore British rule would be planning to change U.S. 
law, not to enforce it.) 
These issues aren’t just for legal sticklers; they’re problems 
that normative defenders of originalism can’t ignore. If Ameri-
can law today isn’t originalist (or as fully originalist as you’d 
like), then knowing that originalism is a good idea in the abstract 
doesn’t tell us very much. It’s like knowing that tax rates ought 
to be different than they are; that doesn’t mean the Supreme 
                                                                                                         
 22. See Green, supra note 20, at xxxix (describing the dispute on this question, on 
which this Article takes no view). 
 23. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) 
(suggesting that originalism “is pooh-poohed by most leading jurists in Canada, 
South Africa, India, Israel, and throughout most of Europe”); see also Bradley W. 
Miller, Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism, in 
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 120, 121 (Canada); Michel 
Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and 
Contrasts, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 633, 656 & n.83 (2004) (Europe). But see Yvonne Tew, 
Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780 (2014) (identify-
ing originalist practices in Malaysia and Singapore). See generally David Fontana, 
Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2010); see also Baude, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 43–45). 
 24. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 4, at 12 (“Originalists agree that our constitutional 
practice both is (albeit imperfectly) and should be committed to the principle that 
the original meaning of the Constitution constrains judicial practice.”). 
No. 3] Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change 827 
 
Court should impose new rates by fiat. Whatever the best rules 
might be, individual officials may have separate moral reasons 
to enforce the law as it exists, whether as special role-obligations 
or just as a means of avoiding bad consequences. 
This is why it may be dangerous for originalists to tie their 
theories too closely to theories of political legitimacy.25 When the 
law deserves our obedience is a question of ethics and politics 
that’s been debated since long before the Constitution was writ-
ten.26 If we can’t resolve our disagreements about the Commerce 
Clause without first solving the problem of political obligation, 
our situation hasn’t improved. And even if originalism were the 
only legitimate way to read the Constitution, our legal system 
might turn out to be only partially legitimate—just as it might 
turn out to be only partially originalist. What our duties would 
be in that case is yet another difficult ethical and political ques-
tion. We might still need to know the law before we can say, de-
finitively, what each of us ought to do. 
2. Originalism as Law Reform 
None of this shows that the normative arguments are wrong. 
If originalism is a good idea, then it’s a good idea; that’s some-
thing worth knowing. 
But it’s not everything worth knowing. If originalism is really a 
law reform project, then the normative arguments may prove too 
much. We could encourage judges and officials to depart from 
current law for lots of reasons, none of which have anything to do 
with originalism: modernizing government administration, pro-
tecting the environment or human rights, preventing war, and so 
on. If the Supreme Court could successfully realize your favorite 
normative end by nonoriginalist means—declaring nuclear 
weapons unconstitutional, creating a libertarian paradise by de-
cree—why should originalism stand in its way? 
Most originalists tend to object to such arguments regardless 
of the cause in question, and without stooping to argue over 
which causes are more worthwhile than others. Originalists 
don’t want to fit the stereotype described by their critics, of a 
                                                                                                         
 25. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 2; Lash, supra note 6, at 1442–43. 
 26. See Andrei Marmor, Legal Conventionalism, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 
19, at 193, 215. 
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political interest group trying to push its policies in the courts.27 
They want to argue, from a neutral standpoint, that their views 
correspond to legal rules that judges and officials are already 
bound to apply.28 When originalists write amicus briefs oppos-
ing the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate,29 for exam-
ple, they tend to say things like “the mandate is unconstitu-
tional,”30 not “the mandate ought to be unconstitutional,” or 
“the Supreme Court could make the world a better place by 
reading the Constitution so as to forbid the mandate.”31 
This kind of phrasing isn’t just lawyer’s talk, or bad faith, or 
even confusion about the nature of the originalist project. As 
Matt Adler notes, originalists and nonoriginalists both make  
these kinds of claims—and seem to believe them—without 
much attention to the underlying legal theories.32 That’s not sur-
prising, because while relatively few people have thought much 
about jurisprudence, lots of people (officials, judges, lawyers, 
conscientious citizens) want to know what the law is, not just 
what it ought to be. If normative justifications for originalism 
have nothing to say to such people, then that’s a problem with 
the justifications, and we should look for something better. 
B. Conceptual Defenses of Originalism 
If a defense of originalism has to be rooted in American law, 
what might that defense look like? Conceptual defenses start 
down that road by combining legal arguments with philosoph-
ical claims about meaning and interpretation. For example, 
everyone seems to think that the Constitution’s meaning is rel-
evant to our law. And if the meaning of a text always and eve-
                                                                                                         
 27. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The 
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 546, 560 (2006). 
 28. Cf. About Us, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD., http://www.fed-
soc.org/aboutus/ [http://perma.cc/9Q8T-5FD7] (last visited Aug. 14, 2014) (“[I]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not 
what it should be”). 
 29. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)–(b) (2012). 
 30. Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the In-
dependence Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. v. Florida (No. 11–398), decided sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 31. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 1 (arguing that normative arguments can be ap-
propriate if the law doesn’t yet resolve the question). 
 32. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1115 (2012). 
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rywhere depends on “original” facts—what its author original-
ly intended it to mean,33 what a reasonable reader in its histori-
cal context would have taken it to mean,34 and so on—then the 
Constitution’s meaning depends on those “original” facts too. 
We could sketch out the conceptual defense, again too simplis-
tically, as something like this: 
 (C1) Our constitutional law is determined by the meaning 
of the document’s text. 
 (C2) The meaning of a text is its original meaning. 
 (C3) Our constitutional law is determined by the original 
meaning of the document’s text. 
Here, too, most of the controversy has focused on the second 
step. There are plenty of contradictory candidates for the One 
True Meaning of a text (speaker’s intentions, readers’ under-
standings, and so on); even originalists disagree about which to 
use.35 But, as before, the real problem with the argument is at 
step one. Even assuming that, after all our philosophizing, one 
type of meaning will emerge triumphant, that still leaves us 
with a problem. Our constitutional law might include more 
than just the meaning of the document’s text. The real disputes 
over “interpretation” aren’t actually interpretive at all; they’re 
about the sources and content of our law, which depend on 
facts about our society today and not at the Founding. No mat-
ter what interpretive method we use, that method could be 
rendered irrelevant or obsolete depending on what else is in 
the law. 
1. What Interpretation Can’t Do 
Part of what makes debates over “constitutional interpreta-
tion” so frustrating is that the participants often seem to have 
different concepts in mind. Suppose that, according to your fa-
vorite interpretive method, you read the original Constitution to 
say X. Someone like Bruce Ackerman might still say, “Sure, the 
Constitution’s text originally said X, but we amended it to Y 
                                                                                                         
 33. See supra note 9. 
 34. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in 
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 42, 48. 
 35. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43–47, 53–55 
(2009). 
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during Reconstruction, the New Deal, and/or the Civil Rights 
Era.”36 True, those “amendments” didn’t follow the (original) 
constraints of Article V. But that’s not a problem for Ackerman, 
who can just say that our legal system happens to permit certain 
informal or extraconstitutional amendments: Article V is one 
way of making amendments, but there are other ways too.37 
Similarly, someone like Philip Bobbitt (or David Strauss, 
Richard Fallon, or Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh) might say, 
“Sure, the Constitution’s text originally said X, but the text isn’t 
the exclusive source of constitutional law. Constitutional law 
also comes from judicial precedents, important statutes, com-
mon-law understandings, longstanding traditions and practic-
es, the ethos of America, norms of prudence, and maybe some 
other things too.”38 Canada’s constitution, for example, is said 
to include not only certain written instruments “but also ‘usage 
and convention,’” as well as “constitutional doctrine—the prin-
ciples and rules derived from the written constitution.”39 How 
do we know that ours is any different? 
We normally talk about disputes like these as being about 
“constitutional interpretation”: Some people think that prece-
dent matters for interpretation, say, and others don’t. But talk-
ing that way just causes confusion. As Timothy Endicott points 
out, “interpretation”—in the sense that conceptual defenses use 
the word—is about the proper way to read something; it 
“comes into play when there is a possibility of argument as to 
[a text’s] meaning.”40 Once we know the communicative con-
tent well enough, once “there is no question as to how a person 
is to be understood,”41 then we’re done interpreting. But we 
might still not be done figuring out the law; there might be ex-
                                                                                                         
 36. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 8–9 
(2014) (Civil Rights Era); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
7–13 (1998) (Reconstruction and New Deal). 
 37. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 329; ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 15–17. 
 38. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7–8, 93 (1982); DAVID A. 
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, 
Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1751 
(2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of 
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1122–23 (2008). 
 39. Miller, supra note 23, at 132. 
 40. Timothy Endicott, Legal Interpretation, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109, 112 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
 41. Id. at 121. 
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tratextual sources of legal authority to consider (precedent, 
longstanding tradition, the American ethos, and so on). We 
can’t rule them out by doing a better job of interpreting text; 
the point is that they’re extratextual, and so have to be defended 
or rejected on other grounds. 
As an example, think of constitutional disputes in the United 
Kingdom, which doesn’t have a written constitution. Whether 
the U.K. has really become part of the European Union, such 
that E.U. law trumps U.K. law regardless of what Parliament 
says, can’t be settled simply by interpreting various acts of Par-
liament. The U.K. Parliament could always declare that it’s su-
preme, but then again the European Parliament could always 
disagree. Likewise, whether the current Parliament can bind a 
future Parliament—the traditional answer is no42—isn’t a ques-
tion that statutes can settle; new ones could be written taking 
either side, and we’d still need to decide which is right. 
The same arguments apply to the United States. Even if part 
of the Constitution’s text called for a particular interpretive 
method,43 that provision could have been superseded by prac-
tice as much as any other. Whether practice has overtaken text 
is something text alone can’t settle.44 One could say that these 
fights are still about “interpretation” of our legal practices writ 
large, but that’s a nonstandard use of the term. What’s clear is 
that these aren’t fights about how to read a particular text, but 
rather about the legal authority that this text wields. 
In fact, most of the time, no one actually disagrees about in-
terpretation anyway. Most everyone accepts that some kind of 
original meaning is legally relevant sometimes; the only live 
disputes are what kind of original meaning, how much it con-
tributes, and whether and when other sources can validly sup-
                                                                                                         
 42. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90 (“Acts of parliament derog-
atory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as 
the Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (argu-
ing that it does); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for its 
Own Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009) (same). 
 44. Cf. Stefan Sciaraffa, The Ineliminability of Hartian Social Rules, 31 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 603, 620 (2011) (noting that “whether a written constitution is live or 
a dead letter comes in degrees,” as official or popular customs “may reference 
some provisions of the constitution and ignore others”); Baude, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 13) (“[E]ven those who would not go so far as to say that docu-
ment itself has been superseded might say that our legal rules for understanding that 
document have been superseded.”). 
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plement or supplant that meaning.45 Only a small group of 
scholars really argue (whether for theoretical reasons or practi-
cal ones) that we’re bound by the current meaning of the Con-
stitution’s words, whatever their original meaning might have 
been.46 Arguments that we should sometimes use judicial prec-
edent, traditions, or the American ethos in place of original 
meaning are only rarely intended as serious claims about the 
meaning of language. (How could a judicial decision or shifting 
normative concerns change the communicative content of a 
written document? Why don’t other legal documents, like draft 
constitutions that were never enacted, also change over time in 
this way?)47 Instead, these claims about precedent and tradition 
are usually intended as claims about different sources of law, 
or different factors that official descisionmakers ought to con-
sider; or, if they aren’t so intended, they could be redescribed 
that way without much loss. 
To put it more generally, knowing how to read the Constitu-
tion’s text doesn’t tell us why we care what it says.48 Whatever 
the right interpretive method might be, we can apply it to all 
sorts of documents—an old newspaper article,49 a restaurant 
order,50 a recipe for fried chicken51—without any of them being 
part of our law. One of the attractions of conceptual arguments 
is that they reference everyday methods for interpreting many 
different types of documents.52 But that broad application is 
                                                                                                         
 45. See Berman, supra note 35, at 10 & n.21 (arguing that few scholars deny that 
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1825 (1997). 
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also why the conceptual defense really needs its first premise—
that the document’s text is authoritative for us, that it serves as 
the ultimate source of our supreme law.53 And in defense of 
this premise, the philosophy of language has nothing to say. 
2. Interpretation and Theories of Jurisprudence 
The first step in the conceptual defense isn’t an interpretive 
claim, but what we might call a “jurisprudential” one—a claim 
about the sources and content of our law. Stating the problem 
this way gives us a rough understanding of the dispute: The 
originalist and the pluralist simply disagree on which sources 
matter.54 To date, this disagreement has been mostly implicit, 
which has made it harder to resolve.55 But it’s still possible that 
social facts ultimately provide the answer, and that this answer 
supports the originalist view. (For example, maybe society really 
does give preeminent authority to the Constitution’s text, which 
is why those other sources—purpose, precedent, tradition, etc.—
have sought the cachet of “interpretation” for so long.) 
Sophisticated conceptual originalists have long defended 
their views based not only on theories of meaning, but also on 
theories of legal authority. To commission some people to en-
act a Constitution, the argument goes, is to take their instruc-
tions as authoritative. So, when we interpret their work, we 
should look for the instructions they were trying to convey. 
Why else would we consult what they wrote, if not for the in-
structions that we asked them to write?56 
Phrasing the argument in these terms, though, also raises new 
problems. If the conceptual defenses themselves depend on con-
tingent features of U.S. law—if they aren’t just the product of the 
philosophy of language—then they can be undone by those 
same contingent features. Even putting to one side separate 
sources of law like precedent, the correct method of interpreting 
a constitutional text might itself be determined by social facts. 
                                                                                                         
 53. See Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, supra note 9, at 94. 
 54. See Berman & Toh, supra note 38; see also Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, 
On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 545 (2013). 
 55. See Matthew D. Adler, Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Rule of 
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 193, 193 
(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Adler, supra note 32. 
 56. See Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, supra note 9, at 539–41. 
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Suppose, for example, that interpretive method A is the only 
one that’s philosophically correct, but the French legal system 
actually interprets their constitution using method B (which 
might be nonoriginalist, or the wrong kind of originalist, 
or . . . ). French lawyers know about the philosophical debates, 
but they’re committed to their own traditional method; com-
mitted all the way down, in principle as well as in practice. An 
originalist might criticize this choice on policy grounds, or 
maybe on conceptual grounds (they’re “reading it wrong”)—
but not on legal grounds, at least not without renouncing posi-
tivism. How could the entire society be getting its own law 
wrong, all the way down? It’d be one thing if French law ex-
plicitly required philosophical correctness, and the lawyers 
mistakenly thought they were complying. In that case, the col-
lective error would be easy to explain.57 But if the French prac-
tice is to ignore the philosophers and to derive legal rules by 
reading their own constitution in their own specific way, how 
can we say that this social practice is legally “incorrect”? 
In other words, the right method of interpretation isn’t al-
ways a philosophical question; there might be law on the sub-
ject, too. All sorts of laws are based on mistaken reasoning of 
one kind or another—tobacco subsidies, rent control, etc.—but 
that doesn’t stop them from being laws. Similarly, a legal sys-
tem can use philosophically defective rules of evidence or 
proximate causation if it wants; what the law is and what it 
ought to be are different things. As Judge Frank Easterbrook 
once put it, believing in nonoriginalist interpretation is like be-
lieving in infant baptism: “Hell yes, I’ve seen it done!”58 
Given that a great many legal systems read their written con-
stitutions in nonoriginalist ways,59 the claim that originalism is 
necessarily or conceptually required by a written constitution is 
hard to credit.60 And if originalism depends on social facts in 
other countries, then presumably it depends on social facts 
here too. How do we know that America isn’t actually like 
France? That’s an empirical question, one that can’t be settled 
by conceptual ruminations about interpreting texts. And even 
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if American law is originalist, it might be the wrong kind of 
originalist: it might focus on the reader’s understanding rather 
than the speaker’s intent, or vice versa. In the end, discovering 
the One True Meaning won’t get us very far; any actual defense 
of originalism has to rest on other grounds. 
C. Positive Arguments for Originalism 
Is our law originalist or not? Originalists ought to confront 
the question head-on. On the surface, the law might not look 
very originalist; but it has deeper features that might well sup-
port another view. This Article offers only a rough sketch of 
what a positive defense of originalism might look like; but this 
sketch, if it seems promising, can be filled in over time. 
To greatly oversimplify (again), a positive defense of 
originalism might look something like this: 
 (P1) Whatever is supported by the right kind of social 
facts is part of our law. 
 (P2) Originalism is supported by the right kind of social 
facts. 
 (P3) Originalism is part of our law. 
At first glance, this argument looks pretty weak. The first 
step is broadly accepted by positivists, but only because it 
leaves out key details: which social facts are “the right kind,” 
how they “support” legal claims, what counts as being “part of 
our law,” or even what “originalism” is supposed to mean. 
Some of these details are left out by necessity. For example, 
even experts disagree about exactly which social conditions 
make something the law.61 Everyone accepts the broad out-
lines: Americans look to the U.S. Code in a way that Swedes 
don’t, and so on. But on contested issues, the details matter. 
Before we can evaluate a positive defense, we need to know if 
those details support originalism. 
Even worse, there’s a lot of nonoriginalism in our everyday 
practice. Whichever social facts actually determine the law, a rea-
sonable theory might well look to the actions of judges and offi-
cials, the doctrines we make students learn in con law class or for 
the bar exam, and so on. As Fallon argues, this everyday practice 
of constitutional law “sometimes permits deviations from the 
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original understanding and even from the superficially plain 
meaning of [the text].”62 Modern originalism began as a criticism 
of what courts were doing, not as a summary of their behavior.63 
Several decades later, self-identified originalists are still a minori-
ty among judges, officials, and law professors.64 How can our law 
be originalist, if our practices and personnel aren’t? 
That said, there are also reasons for the originalist to hope. 
Without having solved all of jurisprudence, we can make some 
plausible guesses about which social facts matter—plausible 
enough for ordinary lawyers to make accurate legal judgments 
on a routine basis. And without conducting sociological studies 
or opinion polls,65 plenty of legal practices are familiar enough 
to be seen from the armchair, some of which may support 
originalist claims. (By way of example, language emerges from 
social practice in complicated ways, too—but you don’t usually 
need opinion polls to tell you how to speak.) 
And everyday practice isn’t the only kind of practice we care 
about. As I’ve contended at length in other work—and what 
follows is necessarily in abbreviated form—the law depends 
more on the shared foundations of our legal reasoning than on 
the particular conclusions we reach or actions we take. Like 
parenting, law involves a good deal of “do what we say, not 
what we do.”66 A clear-eyed sociologist might describe lawyers 
and judges as following a very different set of day-to-day rules 
than what we all think the law actually prescribes: “distort pri-
or cases, advance political agendas, serve elite opinion or 
amour-propre, discount the claims of ethnic or religious minori-
ties,” etc. This external observer, like the Holmesian “bad 
man,” might care only about rules that predict how officials 
                                                                                                         
 62. Fallon, supra note 38, at 1117. 
 63. See supra note 10. 
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will act—but that’s a misleading picture of the law as a whole.67 
Fully understanding the law means trying on the “internal” 
perspective of a faithful participant in the system.68 We need to 
know the social facts of how these participants conventionally 
justify their legal positions, the arguments they’re willing to 
accept and defend in public, and which legal rules they profess 
to derive from other rules or to hold on their own.69 
Sometimes our accepted arguments and our accepted con-
clusions might point in different directions. That is, there might 
be conflict between our general legal principles and our sup-
posedly derivative beliefs about particular rules. Imagine that a 
statute on which we’ve long relied turns out to have been re-
pealed many decades ago;70 imagine that it was a criminal stat-
ute, and that recognizing the long-past repeal would mean let-
ting lots of people out of prison. Maybe this statute would be 
so important, or the crime it addresses so awful, that we 
wouldn’t let it go after the repeal became known. Maybe we’d 
keep the prisoners behind bars anyway, inventing new legal 
justifications to preserve our everyday legal practices intact. If 
that happened, though, it’d clearly be a change to our law, not a 
reflection of its current rules as applied to some unexpected 
facts. Our law isn’t a prediction of what we’ll do when push 
comes to shove, any more than it’s a prediction of what courts 
will do in ordinary circumstances. Our law is what’s currently 
required by the higher-order principles that we currently ac-
cept and defend.71 
When we look to these higher-order principles, the case for 
originalism is far stronger. Originalist claims are standard fea-
tures of our legal practice—something nonoriginalists have oc-
casionally recognized (to their dismay).72 As William Baude has 
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persuasively argued, courts and officials labor mightily to 
avoid anything that smacks of open rebellion against the text or 
its original meaning, however understood. 73  Instead, they 
downplay potential conflicts by pointing to historical ambigui-
ties,74 applying old rules to new facts,75 and so on. Maybe that 
kind of practice—taking original meaning as a constraint on 
other sources of law, without necessarily explaining where 
those other sources came from—is enough to support a posi-
tive defense. Yet this Article tries to go further, moving beyond 
a negative vision of originalism-as-constraint to an affirmative 
vision that synthesizes our reliance on original history with our 
other legal commitments. If this picture of our practices seems 
familiar enough, then it might support a belief that—despite 
appearances—originalism is actually our law. 
II. ORIGINALISM AS THE FOUNDERS’ LAW 
If originalism is really a theory of our law, what theory is it? 
This Article presents originalism as a theory of legal change: Our 
law is still the Founders’ law, as it’s been lawfully changed. 
The motivation here is simple. One problem with the concep-
tual defense was that, even if we knew what the text meant at 
the Founding, this meaning might have been superseded since. 
This theory takes that basic problem and generalizes it. Even if 
we knew what the law was at the Founding, based on the mean-
ing of text or whatever else, this law might have been super-
seded since. The basic, most essential claim of originalism is 
that the Founders’ law has not been superseded—that the “orig-
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inal” law, whatever it was, is still law for us today. We may 
have changed it over time, but only because the law itself pro-
vided for means of change. 
Everyone knows that legal systems change over time. Some-
times those changes comply with the system’s own rules for 
lawmaking; sometimes they don’t. At any particular time, 
though, a legal system combines a practical acceptance of cer-
tain past changes with restrictions on how the law is supposed 
to change in the future. The American legal system, for exam-
ple, accepts all sorts of changes made before the Constitution 
was adopted. Alleged changes made since the Founding, by 
contrast, aren’t accepted as brute historical facts; they need 
some kind of legal justification. Even after two hundred years, 
we share what some scholars have called “constitutional conti-
nuity” with the Founding.76 
Like everything else in law, this claim has to be based on con-
tingent social facts. Not every legal system has to work this way, 
and many don’t. But in our system, explaining when something 
became the law is an important part of establishing how it became 
the law, and in turn to showing that it became the law. This prac-
tice, and our choice of the Founding as a unique starting point, 
makes it plausible that originalism is part of our law. 
A. Two Kinds of Legal Change 
1. Authorized Change 
Legal systems typically contain rules of two different kinds. 
Some we could call “substantive rules,” like “don’t steal” or 
“don’t murder.” But others are “rules of change,” which author-
ize alterations or amendments to the system’s existing rules. Ar-
ticle V amendments are classic examples; so are statutes, treaties, 
shifts in recognized custom and usage, and so on.77 
                                                                                                         
 76. See Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Compari-
son, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 19, at 1, 11 nn.21–22 (discussing the work of 
Hans Kelsen). See generally B.J. Spagnolo, Kelsen and Raz on the Continuity of Legal 
Systems: Applying the Accounts in an Australian Context (2013) (unpublished D Phil 
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author). 
 77. Cf. J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE (2d ser.) 44, 48 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (discussing “rules of succes-
sion of rules”). 
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One important consequence of having rules of change is that, 
until something happens to trigger those rules, everything that’s 
already in the system is supposed to stay the same. That’s what 
it means to have rules of change: if the rules aren’t satisfied, 
there’s no change. We regularly treat unrepealed statutes as law, 
for example, whether they were passed a century ago or in the 
last legislative session.78 They might be superseded by a consti-
tution or a treaty; they might be undone by sunset clauses or 
doctrines like desuetude;79 but unless something else in the law 
acts to get rid of them, they quietly stick around. (In H.L.A. 
Hart’s “picturesque example,” a woman “was prosecuted in 
England and convicted” in 1944 “for telling fortunes in violation 
of the Witchcraft Act, 1735.”80) When we pass new statutes, we 
use traditional canons of construction—such as that implied re-
peals are disfavored, or that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are narrowly construed81—to fit them in with their un-
repealed fellows on the books.82 The last-in-time rule, that new 
law trumps old law, wouldn’t even occur to us but for a pre-
sumption that old law otherwise remains in place.83 To para-
phrase Newton’s First Law of Motion, a statute at rest tends to 
remain at rest, unless acted upon by an outside force. 
The same is true of every other legal object. Someone who 
owned Blackacre a year ago presumably owns it today, unless 
something legally interesting happened in the meantime (a 
sale, a bequest, eminent domain, and so on). Contracts stay 
contracts and torts stay torts, absent some rule to tell us other-
wise. As John Finnis describes, this kind of stability is “a work-
                                                                                                         
 78. See 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 34.1, at 31–32 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the “basic principle of 
law . . . that, unless explicitly provided to the contrary, statutes continue in force until 
abrogated by subsequent action of the legislature.”); Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faith-
ful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 59 (2013) (noting that 
“laws, even ancient laws, continue in force . . . until they are modified or repealed”). 
 79. Cf. Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2006) (noting regretfully 
that, within the United States, desuetude “currently enjoys recognition in the 
courts of West Virginia and nowhere else”). 
 80. HART, supra note 20, at 61 (citing R v. Duncan, (1944) 1 K.B. 713). 
 81. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936–37 (1992); see also Sachs, supra note 110, at 1840–41. 
 82. Cf. HART, supra note 20, at 64 (noting that “Victorian statutes and those 
passed by the Queen in Parliament today surely have precisely the same legal 
status in present-day England”). 
 83. I owe this point to Jessica Bulman-Pozen. 
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ing postulate of legal thought,” one “so fundamental that it is 
scarcely ever identified and discussed.”84 
Perhaps societies and legal systems don’t have to operate this 
way, but there are some excellent reasons why they do. We 
make laws to govern things to come, not things as they are. “At 
least until we devise time machines,” the D.C. Circuit once not-
ed, “a change can have its effects only in the future.”85 This 
prospective lawmaking doesn’t work, as Judge Easterbrook 
points out, unless the “[d]ecisions of yesterday’s legislatures” 
have continuing legal force: “[A]ffirming the force of old laws 
is essential if sitting legislatures are to enjoy the power to make 
new ones.”86 Rather than have Congress reinvent the wheel in 
every new session, we treat our existing law as valid until 
something invokes our rules of change. Leaving the law in 
place in this way lets people find out what it is, and it avoids 
presenting legislators with a moving target. 
Keeping legal rules in place until they’re lawfully changed 
also goes a long way toward maintaining the rule of law. The 
rules of change we have, like other legal rules, might be general 
or specific, vague or precise; there might be legitimately hard 
questions about whether a particular change is authorized or 
not. But in any legal system worthy of the name, the rules of 
change have to have a certain amount of exclusivity or closure. 
They can’t be generally agnostic as to other methods of chang-
ing the law, at least not without casting everything else in the 
system into doubt. (Did that gentle breeze or passing cloud just 
repeal the tax code? How would you know, absent a rule one 
way or the other?) We can imagine a legal system with rules 
that permit no changes, but a legal system that has no rules of 
change looks more like Calvinball.87 
In other words, everyone who actually wants some law also 
wants some rules of change, rules that mostly act by keeping 
things the same. (Anyone who says otherwise is lying about 
                                                                                                         
 84. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 268 (1980). 
 85. Bergerco Canada v. OFAC, 129 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams, J.); 
accord JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 26 (2001). 
 86. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1119, 1120 (1998). 
 87. See Calvinball, THE CALVIN & HOBBES WIKI, http://calvinandhobbes.wikia. 
com/wiki/Calvinball (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) [http://perma.cc/PE35-GMVX] 
(“Calvinball is a game invented by Calvin in which one makes the rules up as one 
goes along.”). 
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wanting some law.) Complaints about the “dead hand,” to be 
taken seriously, can’t just be complaints that we’re still gov-
erned by older law—that’s a basic feature of legal systems, and 
something no sensible person would wish to live without. The 
real complaint is that the rules of change we have aren’t as 
democratic or easy-to-use as they ought to be. But what the law 
is and what it ought to be are different things, and the law we 
have includes its own rules for legal change. 
2. Unauthorized Change 
If the law is supposed to stay the same until it’s lawfully 
changed, then we can use that feature as a test of current rules. If a 
rule is said to be part of the law today, we can ask how it got 
there, and we can expect a certain kind of story in return. Think of 
chains of title: if you want to claim Blackacre, you have to show 
how you got it (e.g., from C, who got it from B, who got it from 
A, . . . ), and only certain explanations are good ones. So we could 
imagine the following story being told about legal rules: Some-
thing is part of the law if and only if it was lawfully added (at t3, 
which altered the law from t2, . . . ), with each step representing a 
valid, authorized, constitutionally continuous change to the law. 
The problem with this story, though, is that authorized chang-
es aren’t the only kind. Chains of title don’t go all the way back, 
and neither do chains of legal justification. (Otherwise, we’d 
have an infinite regress: Where did the rules of change come 
from? Under what rules were they added to the law? Etc.) Law 
being dependent on social facts, it evolves as society does; but 
societies don’t have to evolve according to any particular rules, 
and usually they don’t. Nations get invaded, governments get 
overthrown, perfectly valid rules get abandoned or forgotten, 
and so on. It’d be absurd to insist on legal compliance all the 
way back—concluding, say, that our law today is invalid be-
cause the Constitution disobeyed the Articles of Confederation, 
the Revolution disobeyed British law, the colonists disobeyed 
Native American law, and so on, back to the Norman Conquest 
and beyond. In other words, just because things are legally sup-
posed to change only in certain ways doesn’t mean that they ac-
tually do. The alterations in legal rules that actually occur as a 
matter of social fact, and that don’t obey the preexisting rules, 
we can refer to as unauthorized changes to the law. 
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3. Combining the Two 
In any real-world legal system, the law is a product of both 
authorized and unauthorized changes. The two kinds might 
seem to sit uneasily with each other. Some scholars have even 
suggested that they’re incompatible, that each unauthorized 
change kills off the existing legal system (like a tiny coup 
d’état) and replaces it with another.88 To others, that seems a 
little drastic. According to Joseph Raz, English law underwent 
an unauthorized change in 1966, when the House of Lords as-
serted a power to overrule precedents;89 it’d be odd to say that 
1966 marked the destruction of the English legal system as we 
knew it.90  But how can a legal system really combine both 
kinds of changes at once? How can it have rules of change if it 
doesn’t actually have to follow them in practice? 
In fact, we manage to recognize and comply with both au-
thorized and unauthorized changes all the time. To take a con-
crete example, suppose the President announced tomorrow 
that “all state and local jaywalking laws are hereby repealed.” 
This isn’t something that, under our current rules of change, 
the President can actually do. So a competent American lawyer 
should say that the decree is legally ineffective—in the same 
way that, per Marbury v. Madison, “an act of the legislature, re-
pugnant to the constitution, is void.”91 
But it’s always possible, notwithstanding this legal conclu-
sion, that the President’s gambit would work. Suppose that offi-
cials started acting as if the jaywalking laws had been repealed, 
that codifiers started removing them from the statute books, 
and so on. If enough people—and the right people—started 
accepting the decree as valid, all the way down, then at some 
                                                                                                         
 88. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 219–20 (Anders Wed-
berg trans., 1945); id. at 368–69 (“[T]he State and its legal order remain the same only 
so long as the constitution is intact or changed according to its own provisions.”); cf. 
Michael Steven Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal 
Order, 83 N.C. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2005) (describing any “break in the continuity of 
the legal order,” no matter how small, as “a legal revolution”). 
 89. See Raz, supra note 76, at 11 n.22 (discussing Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.)). 
 90. See HART, supra note 20, at 123 (“[T]he expression ‘the same legal system’ is too 
broad and elastic to permit unified official consensus on all the original criteria of legal 
validity to be a necessary condition of the legal system remaining ‘the same.’”); Raz, 
supra note 76, at 11 (criticizing Kelsen’s view); see also Finnis, supra note 77 (same). 
 91. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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point a positivist would have to say that American law had 
undergone an unauthorized change, and that the jaywalking 
laws really had been repealed.92 
Everyone implicitly accepts some of these unauthorized 
changes already. Our legal system doesn’t worry about wheth-
er the Constitution was authorized by the Articles, just like we 
don’t worry about the legality of the Revolution, colonization, 
or the Norman Conquest. That doesn’t mean that we give up 
on the idea of rules of change—that we throw up our hands 
and say, “the law is whatever it is today,” or “the law is what-
ever society currently accepts.” Those responses are tautolo-
gies, at least for a positivist; they don’t tell us anything we 
didn’t know already. At any given time, the law as it stands has 
some contentful substantive rules and some meaningful con-
straints on how those rules may change. (Without those con-
straints, the substantive rules would lose their content; that’s 
the problem with Calvinball.) Our law requires us, at one and 
the same time, to overlook past violations and to commit to be-
ing rule-governed in the future; to go, and sin no more. 
To put it another way: to adhere to our current law, from the in-
ternal perspective of a faithful participant, means accepting the 
past changes that it accepts, wherever they came from. But it also 
means recognizing, from now on, only the future changes that are 
authorized by our rules of change. Of course we know, from read-
ing history, that our law didn’t emerge in pure fashion like Venus 
rising from the sea—and that it might be altered unlawfully in the 
future, if society rejects its constraints. At that point, like a Jacobite 
after the Glorious Revolution, we might have to revise our inter-
nal commitments, at least if we choose to be faithful to society’s 
new rules. But until that happens, we have sound legal reasons to 
reject any attempts at unauthorized change. 
B. Originalism and Legal Change 
We can now see how to state originalism as a theory of legal 
change. When a given set of laws is in force, those laws are 
supposed to change only in law-governed ways, with a legal 
                                                                                                         
 92. In fact, presidents have actually tried something like this by purporting to 
terminate treaties—a power once thought to reside exclusively with Congress, or 
perhaps with the President-and-Senate, but that the Executive has repeatedly 
claimed with little effective opposition. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Ter-
mination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773 (2014). 
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justification for each new step. But we’ve still got to start 
somewhere. Originalism starts by assigning the legal system an 
origin, namely the Founding. That means it accepts the law as it 
stood at the Founding, regardless of how it got that way. But 
from the Founding on, it requires that changes be lawful—that 
is, that they be made under rules of change that were already 
law at the time, whether those rules were there at the Founding 
or were lawfully added since. 
If this picture is right, then we could roughly (and recursive-
ly) define originalism as making the following three claims 
about the law of the United States: 
(1) All rules that were valid as of the Founding remain val-
id over time, except as lawfully changed. 
(2) A change was lawful if and only if it was made under a 
rule of change that was valid at the time under (1). 
(3) No rules are valid except by operation of (1) and (2). 
This recursive definition might sound strange, but it’s how we 
commonly think about the Constitution’s text.93 We typically rec-
ognize something as part of “the text” if it was in the original 
Constitution or was added by an Article V amendment. But if we 
used an Article V amendment to create a new amendment proce-
dure (say, ratification by referendum), we could then add to the 
text through that procedure too. So another way of describing the 
text is to define it recursively, as whatever was in the original 
Constitution plus whatever’s been added through an amendment 
procedure that was already in place at the time. 
This approach also makes sense as to the Founders’ law as a 
whole. In our system, we take the Founders’ legal rules as hav-
ing a certain sort of prima facie validity; in particular, we don’t 
look behind them to determine whether they were lawfully cre-
ated, under the standards of some earlier time. We also accept a 
wide variety of deviations from the substance of the Founders’ 
rules, when we can give plausible accounts about how those de-
viations were actually lawful when they occurred. The key 
claim—and the most controversial—is the last one: that, at least 
at the level of our higher-order commitments, we accept claims 
of change only if they’re ultimately rooted in the Founders’ law. 
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1. The Rules at the Founding 
Whether we adhere to the Founders’ law is a claim about our 
contemporary law, one that has to be based on contemporary 
social facts. But this contemporary law can still incorporate, in 
certain ways, the law of an earlier time. As it happens, our 
practice is to incorporate the Founders’ law as it stood, without 
worrying about how it got that way. 
a. Incorporating Past Law 
Incorporating other legal rules by reference is remarkably 
common in legal systems. Choice-of-law doctrines, for exam-
ple, routinely direct us to incorporate the law of some other 
society. As Alexander Hamilton reminded his fellow New 
Yorkers in The Federalist, the laws “of Japan not less than of 
New-York may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our 
courts.”94 To determine Japanese law, our legal system usually 
just tells us (or incorporates rules of private international law 
that tell us) to find out what law actually applies in Japan, us-
ing our standard positivist toolbox. 95  From our perspective, 
Japanese law is something found, not made; to borrow a dis-
tinction made by Leslie Green, U.S. officials “can decide 
whether or not to apply” Japanese law, but “they can neither 
change it nor repeal it, and [the] best explanation for its exist-
ence and content makes no reference to [American] society or 
its political system.”96 Our law handles Japanese law the way it 
handles “logic, mathematics, principles of statistical inference, 
or English grammar,” all of which can be “properly applied in 
cases” even though we didn’t make them.97 
We use the same approach for the law of the past. (After all, 
“[t]he past is a foreign country: They do things differently 
there.”98) Think of a property case involving a complex chain of 
title. Under the traditional maxim nemo dat quod non habet—one 
                                                                                                         
 94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 95. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 201, 205(3) (1986); 
accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 101, 113 (1962). 
 96. Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Spring 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/legal-positivism/ 
[http://perma.cc/R584-HZ2R] (discussing Canadian application of Mexican law). 
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 98. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 17 (N.Y. Review Books 2002) (1953). 
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cannot give what he does not have99—a present interest in 
property might depend on the validity of an old conveyance, 
which in turn could depend on the law as it stood at that earlier 
time.100 So we might need to know the law of a previous era to 
know who owns Blackacre today. We don’t use this rule be-
cause we’re forced to do so (in some dead-hand sense) or out of 
slavish devotion to our ancestors. Instead, nemo dat is part of 
our current law, which we know to be law because of current 
social facts, and which we’ve currently chosen to suspend in 
some cases and not others.101 The content of the rule just hap-
pens to involve a cross-reference to the law of an earlier time; 
our law tells us to look up past law, so we do. 
Adherence to the Founders’ law works in much the same 
way. Our modern legal rules are determined by modern social 
facts, but they still instruct us to use the law of an earlier 
time.102 That doesn’t make it easy. To find that law, we have to 
make a number of difficult historical judgments—even after 
we’ve decided, based on positivist theory, what kind of histori-
cal evidence ought to matter. But we could face exactly the 
same difficulties in figuring out the law of a foreign country, or 
determining the validity of some old conveyance. Maybe that’s 
just what our law requires; maybe incorporating past rules of 
law is what we, today, conventionally do. 
In fact, we can adhere to the Founders’ law today even if we 
haven’t always done so, and even if there’ve been occasional in-
terruptions along the way. In the choice-of-law context, diplo-
matic recognition can override positivist theory: when the Unit-
ed States refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China, 
our courts were obliged to assume (with some exceptions) that 
                                                                                                         
 99. See Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
2097, 2120 (2012). 
 100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (determining 
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 102. But see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 46, at 3–4, 6–7 (arguing that present ac-
ceptance requires present-centered modes of interpretation); STRAUSS, supra note 
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mainland China was actually being governed from Taiwan.103 
The same thing can happen with the past: Our law might require 
us to ignore what past law actually was, in favor of what we 
now say it was. An honest positivist in mid-1650s England 
would say that the monarchy had been abolished; but when the 
Restoration came in 1660, the official position of English law was 
that Charles II had been king for the last twelve years.104 Similar-
ly, in Texas v. White, the Supreme Court recognized the “histori-
cal fact” that the Confederate government of Texas, when it was 
“in full control of the State, was its only actual government.”105 
But because that government was “established in hostility to the 
Constitution of the United States,” American courts were duty-
bound not to regard “its acts as lawful acts,”106 except as permit-
ted by the de facto government doctrine.107 
In other words, many U.S. states have already gone through 
periods of revolution and interregnum, which we understand 
through the lens of post-restoration law. If they can do it, so 
can the nation as a whole.108 Whatever our law might have been 
before—during the New Deal, say, or the heady days of the 
Warren Court—what we’re currently obliged to maintain as a 
matter of law and social practice isn’t necessarily what we’ve 
                                                                                                         
 103. See, e.g., Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 
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maintained in the past. Just as current practice could easily dis-
card the law of the Founding, choosing to adopt some other 
law instead, it can also adopt the law of the Founding, notwith-
standing earlier departures therefrom. The best reading of our 
legal practices may be that we adhere to the law of the Found-
ing today, whatever the unusual course of history might show. 
b. Incorporating the Founders’ Law 
Relying on past law is hardly unusual. What’s distinctive 
about American practice, though, is that it relies on the law of 
the Founding. We date our legal system, and our requirements 
for legal change, from the adoption of the Constitution. If that’s 
right, then the Constitution occupies an extremely special place 
in American law, more so than we usually think. The key claim 
isn’t that the Constitution trumps any law of lesser stature—
though that may also be true, and very important. The salient 
claim, for present purposes, is that the Constitution represents 
a boundary in time, separating our present legal system from 
older systems that we’ve discarded. 
When our courts discuss the law of the Founding era, they of-
ten accord it a certain kind of prima facie validity, subject to be-
ing altered later on. This isn’t just limited to historical arguments 
about the constitutional text. The Supreme Court describes state 
sovereign immunity, not as a creature of the constitutional text, 
but as “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States 
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which 
they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Conven-
tion or certain constitutional Amendments.”109 In other words, 
the Founders had law on the subject, and their law stays good 
until we do something about it. Not everyone agrees with the 
Court on sovereign immunity; but agree or not, the picture only 
makes sense if Founding-era law—whether or not it shows up in 
the text—can still continue in force.110 
Law that predated the Founding, though, doesn’t always get 
the same treatment. When the Court directly applies traditional 
rules of unwritten law, as in admiralty cases or state border dis-
putes, it might trace the rules as far back as Blackstone, but rarely 
                                                                                                         
 109. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
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much further.111 What matters is how the doctrine stood when it 
crossed the Atlantic, and then how it developed on this side of the 
pond. Whether the colonial-era legal rules displaced older rules of 
even longer standing just doesn’t matter for their status today.112 
To the extent that the Founding broke from preexisting law, we 
don’t let that stand in our way. The nine state conventions that 
adopted the Constitution in 1788 complied with Article VII,113 but 
they violated the Articles of Confederation, which couldn’t be 
amended or overridden without thirteen legislatures’ consent.114 
In fact, by accepting a new “supreme Law of the Land,”115 the 
conventions may also have violated their own state constitutions, 
which didn’t necessarily permit amendments by that means.116 
In other words, if our system had to be judged by the stand-
ards of the Articles (or before), then we’d reject the Constitu-
tion itself as invalid.117 But in our legal system, trying to vali-
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BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442)); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 
469, 478 (1988) (describing the common law as determining what “lands beneath 
waters under tidal influence were given States upon their admission into the Un-
ion”); id. at 486 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (attempting “to ascertain the extent of 
the King’s rights under English common law,” and bemoaning the lack of “Eng-
lish cases of the late 18th and early 19th centuries” in particular). 
 113. Cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–31 (2001) (discussing why the Constitution became 
law in 1788, rather than 1787, 1789, or some other year). 
 114. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII; see also ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 34–36. 
 115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 116. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 36–39; AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES 
WE LIVE BY 58–60 (2012). 
 117. Some academics have tried to explain this away. One recasting of Ackerman’s 
theory, for example, describes ratification as legally authorized because it was an act of 
true popular sovereignty, and such acts—usually found in five-phase constitutional 
moments—have always been permitted by our rules of change. See ACKERMAN, 
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 66–68. Akhil Amar has argued that Articles’ 
widespread violation rendered them nonbinding under international law, see AMAR, 
supra note 108, at 29–33; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 297–98 (James 
Madison), and that the state conventions were exemplars of popular sovereignty for 
the time, see AMAR, supra note 108, at 10–18, 308–11; AMAR, supra note 116, at 60–63. 
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date the Constitution in terms of preexisting law is both un-
helpful and unnecessary. Even if you succeeded, that’d just 
push the problem further back, requiring us to decide the legal 
status of the Revolution, colonization, the Norman Conquest, 
and so on. For contemporary legal purposes, we simply don’t 
care. By contrast, it is legally relevant today whether a particu-
lar act of Congress, state statute, or judicial decision is con-
sistent with the Constitution of 1788—even if we might have 
some other legal reasons, discussed below, to leave a few in-
consistencies in place. To the extent that law is a matter of so-
cial convention, our thoroughgoing agreement on the Found-
ers’ law (regardless of what might have happened earlier) 
makes the Founding the starting point of our law. 
This reliance on the Founding isn’t just a matter of American 
culture or filial piety, the way many nonoriginalists describe it.118 
Many Americans do revere the Founders, but societies’ deep legal 
practices usually have more than one reason supporting them. 
Parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom, as Leslie Green 
notes, might “rest, not only on a common practice of treating 
[statutes] as supreme, but also on a belief that this practice is 
democratic or is central to our culture.”119 Those cultural beliefs 
supplement rather than supplant the particular conventions that 
constitute our legal practices. American society doesn’t accept the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996120 out of filial piety toward Newt 
Gingrich and his fellows in the 104th Congress, let alone toward a 
Founding generation that never heard of the Internet. We accept it 
because it was passed by Congress and has never been repealed. 
In the same way, it’s our practice to adhere to the Founders’ law, 
as lawfully changed. Whether or not we share the moral and po-
                                                                                                         
But the new Constitution may have been democratically legitimate, deserving of obe-
dience, and so on, without actually being legal under preexisting rules. See Stephen E. 
Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 1825–
28 (discussing this possibility); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 94, at 264–67 
(James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 297. 
 118. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1683, 1697 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1920 & nn.10–15 (2012) (collecting sources); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 790 
n.289 (2010); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Prin-
ciple, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719 (2003). 
 119. Green, supra note 20, at xxiii. 
 120. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
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litical traditions of the Founders, we continue a legal tradition that 
started at the Founding and that we haven’t abandoned since.121 
2. Changes Since the Founding 
The Founders’ rules weren’t fixed in amber. We’ve altered 
them in innumerable ways, even on foundational matters. In 
our legal practices, though, one reliable way to defend those 
changes is to present them as authorized, rather than unauthor-
ized—as continuations of the Founders’ law rather than depar-
tures. In other words, it’s part of our higher-order legal rules to 
accept what’s lawfully done under the Founders’ rules as law. 
Often we explain important developments in our law by de-
scribing them as applications of unchanging rules to changing 
facts. When we can’t do that, because it’s impossible to deny 
that the law has changed, we defend the changes under lawful 
rules of change, whether rooted in the Founding era or added 
since. And when that won’t work either, because the law has 
clearly been violated, we rely on various doctrines found else-
where in the law to cure the violations or to prevent them from 
causing more mischief. Even stare decisis, the most prominent 
arrow in the nonoriginalist quiver, commonly functions as one 
of these “domesticating doctrines”—and is commonly rooted 
in Founding-era sources. The point is not, or at least not yet, 
that these are the only kinds of arguments we can make. The 
point is that these arguments are thought to be successful, part-
ly because of their connection to the Founders’ law. 
a. Rules and Outcomes 
One familiar feature of legal rules is that the same rule can 
produce changing outcomes over time. Rules usually take ac-
count of various facts about the world; when the facts change, 
the outcomes change too.122 As a result, when we try to explain 
                                                                                                         
 121. Cf. Balkin, supra note 78, at 68 (“Americans do not understand themselves 
as having abandoned their constitution, either in whole or in part.”); David 
Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinc-
tion, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479, 497 (1988) (“That we feel that the constitutional provi-
sions are still very much present law suggests that we understand ourselves as 
having a single tradition (however complex and polysemous), stretching back and 
including the context in which the provisions were first written down and rati-
fied.”). 
 122. See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011). 
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a legal development that differs from the Founding era, argu-
ing that it’s simply a change in application is usually taken as a 
good argument, even if the outcome diverges from the Found-
ing generation’s specific plans or intentions. 
Legal rules can take as their inputs (or incorporate by refer-
ence) a variety of different things: empirical facts about the 
world, mathematics, social customs, other legal systems’ rules, 
perhaps moral judgments, and so on.123 At risk of belaboring 
the obvious—though it’s led a few scholars into confusion124—
if these things evolve over time, so does the law. In states that 
have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, im-
plied warranties arise from the “usage of trade”;125 as trade us-
age develops, so will the legal obligations of buyers and sellers. 
The Constitution forbids habeas suspensions “unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it”;126 public safety might require a suspension at time t1 but not 
t2, and then again at t3. And when the amount of trade across 
state lines expands beyond the dreams of the Founders, so will 
the significance of the power conferred by the Commerce 
Clause,127 even leaving the scope or nature of that power entire-
ly the same. These trends may stray very far from the Found-
ing, but that’s only because of the particular inputs that the 
Founders chose to make significant. To paraphrase Christopher 
Green, the choice of one legal rule over another “is a choice 
about what sorts of changes should make a difference.”128 
More importantly, when this distinction is offered in consti-
tutional arguments, it goes a long way toward providing a le-
gally acceptable account of change. In defending the New Deal, 
for example, Franklin Roosevelt argued that the Framers “used 
specific language” for some purposes and “generality, implica-
tion and statement of mere objectives” for others—allowing the 
law, “within the Constitution, [to] adapt to time and circum-
                                                                                                         
 123. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text; see also Green, supra note 20, 
at xxxix (describing the dispute over moral judgments). 
 124. See, e.g., Green, supra note 122, at 579–90 (discussing Raoul Berger and Jed 
Rubenfeld). 
 125. U.C.C. § 2-314(3). 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 128. Green, supra note 122, at 583; cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 335 (describing a 
particular plan’s “economy of trust”). 
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stance.”129 On commerce, taxes, and spending, Roosevelt said, 
the Framers intentionally chose “broad and general language” 
that was “capable of meeting evolution and change.”130 Roose-
velt didn’t have to make this argument; he could have said, as 
many Progressives did, that the preexisting law was constrain-
ing and outdated and might need to be cast aside.131 But that 
would have been visibly contrary to existing legal norms, in a 
way that applying existing law to new facts was not. 
For another prominent example, consider Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.132 Some people treat Brown’s statement that “[i]n approach-
ing this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868”133 as an 
official rejection of prior law by the Court.134 But that statement 
merely describes current facts about education as inputs to a rule 
about equality. “[T]his problem” is “the effect of segregation itself 
on public education,”135 and in solving it, the Court quite obvious-
ly “must consider public education in the light of its full devel-
opment and its present place in American life.”136 
This kind of explanation is a standard feature of controver-
sial decisions. When the Court upheld a state debt-relief law 
under the Contracts Clause, it didn’t assert any new emergency 
power to respond to the Great Depression. Instead, it claimed 
to be applying implicit limitations already found within the 
                                                                                                         
 129. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address on Con-
stitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), The American Presidency Project, http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459 [http://perma.cc/HR8S-6RS8]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNIT-
ED STATES 193–94 (1908). 
 132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 133. Id. at 492. 
 134. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1955); Miguel Schor, Foreword: Contextualizing the 
Debate Between Originalism and the Living Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 961, 967 
(2011); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 88 
(2010); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You? Neutral Principles and 
the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1052 (2009) 
(“[W]hatever originalism means with respect to other constitutional issues, when 
it comes to the Equal Protection Clause and its application to questions of race-
conscious government action, the Court seldom looks back beyond Brown.”). 
 135. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. 
 136. Id. On the relation between Brown and originalist theory, see Sachs, supra 
note 1, at 2276–77; Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 27–28). 
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Clause, whose “prohibition is not an absolute one.”137 When the 
Court expanded the ban on poll taxes to state elections, it 
claimed to be applying an unchanging requirement of equal 
protection in light of the “[n]otions of what constitutes equal 
treatment” that “do change.”138 For present purposes, whether 
the claims in these two cases were true—or even sincere—is 
less significant than the fact that they were made. In fact, from 
a positivist standpoint, they might be even more relevant if 
they were insincere, because they display the felt pressure of a 
conventional norm not to depart from preexisting rules.139 
b. The Founders’ Rules of Change 
When it’s clear that the law really has changed, over and above 
a change in applications, it’s part of our practice to accept and de-
fend those changes based on lawful rules of change. The Found-
ers might not have planned on slavery’s abolition, income taxes, 
or women’s suffrage,140 but they included an Article V that made 
those things possible. They might have been repulsed by the idea 
of a standing army, but so long as the budget is reapproved every 
two years, nothing in the Constitution stands in its way.141 These 
are entirely conventional means of legal change, but an awful lot 
has been accomplished through them. 
The range of potentially lawful changes since the Founding 
may be even broader than most originalists are used to. To find 
out the Founders’ law, we have to apply our positivist toolbox 
to facts about the past. To find out their rules of change, and 
what changes have actually been made under them, we have to 
look and see. This means that the rules of change—and the 
sorts of lawful changes that have been made—depend on histo-
ry, not constitutional theory, and could upend some conven-
tional views of originalism. 
Some people argue, for example, that under the Founders’ 
law, “a regular course of practice” could (as James Madison put 
it) eventually “liquidate & settle the meaning” of obscure pro-
                                                                                                         
 137. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (construing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1); see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 2283. 
 138. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
 139. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2283; Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 32–34). 
 140. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XVI, XIX. 
 141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
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visions in the Constitution’s text.142 If, according to our positiv-
ist toolbox, the right people shared this belief in the right way, 
then it could have reflected an actual Founding-era legal rule, 
and it could allow certain post-Founding conduct to determine 
the Constitution’s legal content. That might seem antithetical to 
originalism, which is often portrayed as having laser-like focus 
on the Founding moment.143 Yet this analysis is focused on the 
Founding moment; the question is what the law was then. The 
only reason why liquidation might be lawful, on this picture, is 
that it was already part of Founding-era law, or was lawfully 
added by something that was. 
This kind of originalism was on display in NLRB v. Noel Can-
ning,144 when the Court faced a potential conflict between con-
stitutional text and post-Founding practice. At oral argument, 
the Solicitor General suggested that practice could trump clear 
constitutional text.145 Not one Justice took that view. In fact, 
though the Court majority found the text ambiguous, 146  it 
didn’t simply declare that tradition, as an independent source 
of law, could govern in its stead. Rather, the Court took pains 
to emphasize the Founding-era support for letting tradition 
play this subsidiary role—citing Madison on liquidation, John 
Marshall on government practice, and related precedents back 
to Stuart v. Laird.147 In other words, it was willing to treat post-
Founding tradition as a source of law because doing so had al-
ready been authorized at the Founding. 
                                                                                                         
 142. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting James Madi-
son, Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 
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liam Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811–
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 144. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–8, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12–
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 146. 134 S. Ct. at 2561, 2568. 
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This openness to Founding-era rules of change is an im-
portant aspect of our legal practices, because it allows people 
with many different methodological commitments to seek shel-
ter in the Founding. Stephen Griffin, for example, takes a rather 
dim view of modern originalism, but he also argues that “each 
contemporary method of interpretation is the result of a tradi-
tion that extends back at least to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion”; he describes his preferred “pluralistic theories” as justify-
ing a menagerie of interpretive methods on the basis of 
“source[s] of law that preexisted the Constitution, such as stat-
utes and the common law,” which are “understood to be legit-
imate” in our legal system.148 Other people sometimes argue, 
relying on similar intuitions, that the Founders recognized an 
amendment process outside of Article V,149 that they had a 
common-law constitution,150 that they accepted “active liberty” 
as a constitutional principle,151 and so on. 
From this Article’s perspective, all of these can be originalist 
arguments.152 If you want to argue that some novel method of 
legal change was part of the Founders’ law, go ahead; original-
ism is a big tent. But your argument only makes a difference if 
it’s true. Someone trying to assert an unusual Founding-era rule 
has to be ready to show that it was actually law back then, not 
just political theory or social custom,153 in a way that’d satisfy a 
positivist’s demands. The Founders might have really liked ac-
tive liberty, but they also might have liked raindrops on roses 
and whiskers on kittens; we need to know what was part of 
their law. And one reason why modern originalists tend to be 
skeptical of these novel methods is that, as a historical matter, 
the positive case is usually hard to win. 
This ecumenical approach might seem strange. Maybe it’d 
even persuade modern originalists to reject the Founders’ 
law—making the tent so big as to drive them out, lest they have 
to share it with all the active-liberty types. In their defense, our 
                                                                                                         
 148. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1195–96. 
 149. See AMAR, supra note 108, at 295–99. 
 150. See STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 123. 
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social conventions don’t have to be the same as the Founders’ 
were; it’s conceivable that we, today, have a different legal sys-
tem than they did, and that we only care about Framers’ expec-
tations, determinate rules, and so on. But if that wasn’t what 
the law actually provided at the Founding, then it’d be rather 
odd for us to give the pronouncements of the Framers and Rat-
ifiers even more legal effect than their contemporaries did.154 
That would mean attributing to modern America—in the name 
of originalism, no less—a number of legal rules that were never 
the law at the Founding and have only been invented since. 
Picking and choosing among the Founders’ rules, obeying 
some of their doctrines and replacing others, might in the end 
produce an arrangement that’s normatively superior to what 
they had. But in an important sense, it wouldn’t be very original-
ist. The Constitution, and the Founders’ legal system as a whole, 
was only as crisp and determinate as it actually was.155 As noted 
above, why should we try to be more originalist than the Found-
ers, or more Catholic than the Pope? In the absence of a clear 
modern consensus for this view, it seems more consistent with 
our current conventions to look to our original law, and to the 
rules of change—precise or flexible—that it actually contained. 
c. Domesticating Doctrines 
No matter how flexible the Founders’ rules were, though, 
they haven’t been inviolably observed. Legislatures have 
passed unconstitutional laws, courts have made mistaken rul-
ings, ordinary people have committed crimes, and so on. If we 
adhere to the Founders’ law, then the natural response is to say 
that those unlawful, erroneous, or invalid actions didn’t cause 
our legal rules to change. This, too, is reflected in our practice; 
that’s why we describe an unconstitutional statute, a judgment 
without jurisdiction, or a fraudulent conveyance as “void.” 
But that response might seem much too extreme. Of course 
our legal rules aren’t pure all the way back;156 but it’s not even 
clear that they go back as far as the Founding. Is every non-
originalist precedent headed to the chopping block, the better 
                                                                                                         
 154. Cf. Powell, supra note 142, at 887–88 (making a similar argument). 
 155. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014). 
 156. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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to restore the purity of the Founders’ law? And if so, how do 
we reconcile the Founders’ law with our present practices? 
To answer these questions, it’s important to recognize that we 
already deal with similar problems every day, in numerous are-
as of private and public law. Like every sophisticated legal sys-
tem, we have a plethora of doctrinal tools to ratify unlawful ac-
tions, making them effectively valid even if they weren’t valid ab 
initio. Adverse possession is an easy example: what starts as a 
trespass can, after enough time and under the right conditions, 
eventually turn into good title.157 The doctrine avoids any need 
to tear up old arrangements to preserve yet older ones intact; 
although the initial dispossession was unlawful, we accept the 
subsequent change in ownership as a lawful change because of a 
rule that was already part of our law when title passed. 
Some domesticating doctrines, like adverse possession, actually 
cure legal errors by changing the underlying entitlements. Other 
doctrines don’t so much cure the errors as cauterize them, pre-
venting any infection from spreading through the system. When a 
court, for example, mistakenly finds that A has better title to 
Blackacre than B, preclusion doctrines require us to act as if the 
court got it right.158 At the same time, the judgment between A 
and B doesn’t bind third parties,159 it can be set aside for fraud,160 
it’s reversible on appeal, and so on—none of which would make 
sense if A really had better title to Blackacre once judgment issued. 
The court’s ruling establishes the law of the case, but not the law. 
Our law is full of doctrines that operate in this “as if” way. A 
statute of limitations doesn’t eliminate the underlying right; it 
just deprives the plaintiff of a remedy in this particular jurisdic-
tion.161 The de facto officer doctrine doesn’t give officers power 
they don’t possess; it just prevents subsequent collateral attacks 
on their actions.162 And so on. 
                                                                                                         
 157. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1–40 (2014) (granting title after 20 years of ad-
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To the unfamiliar, these doctrines may seem like lawyer’s 
tricks. How can our practices require lawful change, if they ac-
cept so many changes we know to have been unlawful? But these 
aren’t tricks, any more than preclusion or adverse possession. 
There are good reasons for not looking behind a jury’s verdict or 
an undisturbed occupancy, and in fact our law tells us not to. 
These doctrines are features of our continuing legal practices, 
not exceptions. And we allow them to domesticate things we’d 
otherwise see as legal errors precisely because we understand 
the doctrines themselves, not only to be good ideas, but to have 
their own good titles to legal validity in our system. 
Moreover, the fact that we need such doctrines shows some-
thing important about our practices. When we confront past legal 
errors (trespasses, mistaken judgments, officers acting without 
authority) we don’t just shrug our shoulders and ignore them, or 
point out the policy reasons for and against correcting the law. 
Societies develop domesticating doctrines precisely because their 
laws demand legal explanations, and not just policy arguments, 
for overlooking past violations—even violations that occurred 
long ago. Our domesticating doctrines are themselves powerful 
evidence of a legal system committed to lawful change. 
d. Stare Decisis 
This analysis gives us a useful way to think about stare deci-
sis in an originalist system. It’s surely true that there are many 
nonoriginalist precedents on the books, that precedent is a 
prominent part of our current legal practice,163 and that this 
state of affairs is widely thought to conflict with originalism.164 
Reconciling originalism with precedent has become something 
of a cottage industry.165 
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Viewed as a domesticating doctrine, though, stare decisis 
doesn’t seem very threatening to the Founders’ law. In fact, it 
seems like evidence in favor. It’s hardly unusual that a good 
claim, even a good constitutional claim, might be barred by rules 
like laches, waiver, or estoppel; in those cases, we might act as if 
the substantive law went against the claimant, even though we 
really know otherwise. In the same way, our present practices of 
stare decisis might require us to act as if a prior court decision 
were correct, even if we suspect that it isn’t. What matters for pre-
sent purposes is whether we accept and defend that doctrine in 
terms of its own historical roots—and, as it happens, we do. 
This picture of stare decisis is easiest to explain in the lower 
courts. When a three-judge appellate panel issues a ruling, it es-
tablishes the law of the circuit, requiring district courts (and may-
be also future panels) to decide cases as if the panel’s opinion were 
well-reasoned.166 None of this, of course, means that the panel’s 
decision is right on the law: Other circuit judges can call for review 
en banc, the parties can seek overruling by the Supreme Court, 
and so on. We might talk about a particular search-and-seizure 
ruling as “the law of the Fourth Circuit,” but we don’t actually 
think that the Fourth Amendment requires different things in 
Maryland than it does in Delaware. We just mean that if we make 
a certain kind of argument in the District of Maryland, we’re like-
ly to lose before the trial court and the court of appeals, and we’ll 
have to take our chances on certiorari. This is all highly relevant to 
our legal planning (and, perhaps, to qualified immunity167), but 
not to the ultimate substance of the law. 
This is an extremely common way to handle legal uncertainty 
in a hierarchical system. In many areas of government, as Kent 
Greenawalt notes, lesser officials “follow what their bosses tell 
them about the law”; the “police on the beat” don’t “try to figure 
out the law for themselves,” but instead rely on “what their su-
pervisors tell them is legally permitted and legally required.”168 
Some officers may even have a legal duty to accept, in most cases, 
                                                                                                         
 166. See John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 508, 511 & n.23, 530 & n.88 (2000). 
 167. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). 
 168. Kent Greenawalt, How to Understand the Rule of Recognition and the American 
Constitution, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 55, at 145, 153. 
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their superiors’ legal judgment in place of their own—the way the 
U.S. Marshals are legally required to “execute all lawful writs,” 
whether or not the underlying court decisions were correct.169 
The same analysis applies to the Supreme Court. Lower 
courts may be required to act as if the Court’s opinion correctly 
states the law—something that, again, is immensely relevant to 
our legal planning (and has real legal impact in habeas cas-
es).170 So for practical purposes, we speak of the Supreme Court 
determining “the law,” just like we talk about “the law of the 
Fourth Circuit.”171 But while inferior tribunals have to obey the 
Court, they don’t have to agree with it, and neither does any-
one else. As Caleb Nelson notes, any modern lawyer would 
understand what it means to say that “[t]he Constitution plain-
ly establishes Rule X, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it 
to establish Rule Y instead, and the Court is not going to over-
rule that interpretation.”172 
Indeed, not even the Justices see precedent as wholly replac-
ing the underlying law. That’s why, for example, it’s possible for 
them to describe stare decisis as “‘a principle of policy’” and 
“not an inexorable command.”173 That’s also why, within the 
language of American law, we can sensibly talk of the Court 
“overruling” even foundational cases like Marbury 174  or 
M‘Culloch v. Maryland175—cases that can be judged “correct” or 
“incorrect” according to some external standard—in a way that 
we can’t talk about the Court “overruling,” say, the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause.176 The point isn’t that the constitutional text 
takes primacy, but that external rules of law do—rules that 
courts are charged to apply correctly, even if they sometimes fall 
                                                                                                         
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (2012). 
 170. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), (d)(1)(C), 2254(d)(1), (e)(2)(A)(i), 2255(f)(3), 
(h)(2) (2012). 
 171. See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 153–57. 
 172. Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 921, 937 (2013). 
 173. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563, 578 (2003) 
(stating that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), “was not correct when it 
was decided, and it is not correct today,” though in the interim it was fully “au-
thoritative” as precedent). 
 174. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 175. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see David A. Strauss, Legitimacy, “Constitutional 
Patriotism,” and the Common Law Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 50, 50 (2012). 
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short. (The Court often invokes relatively low-status sources of 
law—international law to decide border disputes,177 say—but 
that doesn’t mean it can “reinterpret” those rules however it 
wants, or redraw all our maps for policy reasons.) 
The real originalist question about stare decisis, then, isn’t 
whether its results sometimes depart from otherwise-correct an-
swers (of course they do) or replace those answers with new ones 
(of course they don’t). The real question is whether this doctrine, 
as a domesticating doctrine, has its own good title to being part of 
our law—whether it was part of the law at the Founding or has 
been lawfully added since. And as it turns out, arguments to this 
effect are legion. People say that the “judicial power” necessarily 
requires a doctrine of precedent,178 that the Constitution makes 
federal judges its supreme expositors,179 that stare decisis was a 
common-law heuristic for cases of judicial uncertainty,180  that 
common-law decision-making has, as Strauss argues, “been cen-
tral to the American legal system from the start,”181 and so on. 
Whether any of these arguments are right is a historical matter; 
but the fact that they’re offered is consistent with our convention-
al practice of demanding adherence to the Founders’ law. 
If this analysis is right, then the same historical approach 
ought to determine what kind of stare decisis we have. To over-
turn a precedent, is it enough that the precedent be “demon-
strably erroneous,”182 or do we need “some special reason over 
and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided”?183 
Does a precedent bind other government actors in the exercise 
of their own constitutional functions, or are they free to disa-
gree?184 Can Congress abrogate or alter stare decisis, or is it 
                                                                                                         
 177. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 523 U.S. 767, 784 (1998). 
 178. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899–
900, vacated as moot on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 179. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 180. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1 (2001); cf. Sachs, supra note 110, at 1863–66 (describing this account). 
 181. David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 
977 (2011). 
 182. Nelson, supra note 180, at 1. 
 183. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 864 (1992). 
 184. Compare, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that “the feder-
al judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”), with Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 
(2003) (criticizing this view). 
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wholly the domain of the judiciary?185 We often look to the 
Court to answer these questions, but that’s just regular stare 
decisis in action; we still need an account of where the Court 
should be getting the answers. If the Founders’ law answered 
these questions in a particular way, then the same answers 
govern today—unless something happened in between. 
Again, this conclusion may seem contrary to most modern 
originalism. But in one sense it’s hard to see why an originalist 
should come out any differently. If the Founders’ law really did 
make the Court the supreme expositor of the Constitution, 
when did they lose that power? And if they weren’t given that 
power under the law of the Founding, when did they get it, 
and how? Before concluding that originalism automatically un-
settles decades of precedent, we first have to take a view on 
what our original law actually provides. 
3. Originalism as Exclusive Law 
All this suggests that the Founders’ law, together with lawful 
changes, is at least one part of our law today—that we accord it 
some kind of prima facie validity. We might call that mild claim a 
weak form of originalism, though one so watered-down as barely 
to deserve the name.186 On this Article’s view, the best under-
standing of originalism is the far stronger position in the defini-
tion above: that no rule is valid unless it can be rooted in the 
Founders’ law. The claim isn’t just that the Founders’ law (when 
we can determine what it is) has priority over other law that’s de-
veloped independently. The claim is that there is no other law—
that no other legal rules are actually part of our legal system.187 
This Article won’t present anything like a full defense of this 
claim. To be complete, that defense would need a much more 
detailed positivist theory—which social conventions determine 
the law, who has to hold them, how we identify them, and so 
on. Instead, this Article merely suggests, via armchair sociolo-
gy, some reasons to find the claim plausible. 
                                                                                                         
 185. See generally John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 
50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 165; Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential 
Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000). 
 186. See Berman, supra note 35, at 10, 17–23. 
 187. Cf. Baude, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6, 10–12, 45–50) (contrasting “exclu-
sive” and “inclusive” originalism with more moderate positions). 
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More importantly, the goal of this Article isn’t really to con-
vince you that we still adhere to the Founders’ law. In fact, if 
you come away from reading it convinced that we don’t, then 
it’ll have been a success. The goal is to show why this is the 
right question to be asking, if we really want to know whether 
(or to what extent) originalism is the law. 
a. Premises of Legal Argument 
Our legal practices care about history. Whether a rule has the 
right historical pedigree does a great deal to show that it’s part 
of our law. Indeed, this is often where originalist arguments 
derive their rhetorical force. In the oral arguments in Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, Justice Scalia repeatedly asked respondents’ 
counsel to identify when the law had changed on same-sex 
marriage: “When do you think it became unconstitutional?”188 
If we can’t say when things have changed, that makes it harder 
to explain how they changed, which makes us less confident 
that they’ve changed. We don’t always need a specific month or 
year; counsel’s answer, that the issue turns on “when we . . . as 
a culture determine[] that sexual orientation is a characteristic 
of individuals that they cannot control,”189 is a claim of chang-
ing outcomes due to changing facts. But we do need a reason, 
and this reason usually has a rough location in time. If we can’t 
identify the time, then something seems wrong, and our argu-
ment seems to be more about law reform than law. 
Many scholars who may not call themselves originalists rec-
ognize this feature of our practice. According to Lawrence Les-
sig, for example, when Americans confront the change in consti-
tutional understandings before and after the New Deal, they 
typically conclude either that the pre-New Deal understanding 
was wrong, that the post-New Deal understanding is wrong, or 
“that some political act sufficed to authorize this judicial trans-
formation.”190 In other words, in the American legal system, it 
matters how you got from there to here. This search for a histori-
cal pedigree only makes sense if we have reason to find one; that 
is, if our legal rules are expected to be rooted in prior law. 
                                                                                                         
 188. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 39. 
 189. Id. at 40. 
 190. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395, 400 (1995) (noting this response, but criticizing it as a false 
choice). 
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That requirement limits the kinds of legal arguments that we 
accept. Consider, for example, the holding of Reynolds v. Sims, un-
der which the Constitution requires state legislative districts to 
have roughly equal numbers of people.191 Originalism, as this Ar-
ticle defines it, conceivably offers a number of ways to argue for 
that conclusion. Maybe equal apportionment was part of U.S. law 
at the Founding (a hard argument to win). Maybe it became part 
of our law in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal pro-
tection clause was validly adopted.192 Maybe it became part of our 
law at some later point, as the abstract requirement of equal pro-
tection was applied to changing facts, or when the population dif-
ferences across districts became so stark as to trigger some latent 
constitutional rule. Maybe it only became part of our law when 
the Supreme Court decided Reynolds in 1964, under some theory 
on which the Court has power to do things like that (and this 
power itself has the right kind of historical pedigree, and so on).193 
Or maybe the Court simply got it wrong in Reynolds or in the cas-
es that it cited,194 but we’re now obliged to act as if those cases 
were correct, under some doctrine of stare decisis that really is 
part of our law. And so on. 
On this Article’s view, all of those arguments are theoretically 
possible, and only history can decide among them. But now con-
sider what rejecting this view might entail. Suppose someone 
wanted to argue for the Reynolds rule while systematically deny-
ing each of the claims above. Suppose they conceded that equal 
apportionment was not the law at the Founding, that it was not 
validly adopted in 1868, that it does not follow from applying 
rules to changing facts, that the Court had not been authorized to 
impose the rule on its own, that its decision does not deserve re-
spect as a matter of stare decisis (or any other doctrine finding 
its roots in the Founding era), and so on. They just think, not-
withstanding all this, that Reynolds is still the law. 
                                                                                                         
 191. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). 
 192. This seems to have been the Court’s reasoning. See id. at 568. 
 193. For instance, a power to create implementing doctrines to enforce other 
constitutional requirements, see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and 
the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006); see also AMAR, supra note 
116, at 192–94, 223–30, 261 n.* (defending Reynolds as enforcing the Republican 
Government Clause). 
 194. See 377 U.S. at 557–61 (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)). 
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Whatever else you might say about that position, it isn’t 
originalist. In fact, it’s the distillation of nonoriginalism: a claim 
that something that has no roots in the Founders’ law is none-
theless our law today. More importantly, it’s very different 
from the way we usually speak and argue in legal contexts—so 
much so that it almost doesn’t sound like a legal argument. 
Sure, there are plenty of arguments out there for the Reynolds 
rule, whether based on political theory,195 pure morality, pru-
dence, or something else; sometimes lawyers make such argu-
ments and win. But at the same time, everyone recognizes that 
what the law is and what it ought to be are different things—
and the same goes for what lawyers say and what they ought 
to say. Lawyers often win cases by playing on our prejudices, 
and yet we don’t call those sources of law.196 
A nonoriginalist claim like this might still be true as a positiv-
ist matter. No legal system can insulate itself from social facts. 
But at any given time, the law imposes some rules of change, 
over and above the tautological surrender of “the law is what-
ever it is.” And it’s plausible to think that the higher-order 
principles we currently accept, the ones that do the important 
work in defining the content of our law, require some kind of 
reference to the Founding. 
If this is right, then we can understand why original-law 
originalism would claim to be exclusive—rather than just tak-
ing priority over other sources that might operate in cases of 
ambiguity or uncertainty. Lots of things in today’s law are un-
certain, and yesterday’s law was no different. Even if we were 
sure about the Founders’ substantive law, we might still be un-
sure about their rules of change, the historical events that 
might have occasioned changes, how much change those his-
torical events produced, or how the new rules (thus modified) 
should apply to current facts. As it happens, we have plenty of 
legal techniques for reducing uncertainty, which can be applied 
here too.197 But even irreducible uncertainty doesn’t always give 
                                                                                                         
 195. Cf. id. at 565 (“Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative 
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State 
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 196. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 2266. 
 197. E.g., closure rules such as “everything not forbidden is permitted” or “the 
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion.” The Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
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granted or reserved. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth 
868 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
 
us a permission slip to bring in new sources of law; often it just 
leaves us uncertain. A statute punishing “neglect” of a child 
might be irreducibly vague in many situations;198 a judge trying 
to apply it might feel utterly at sea; but a judge who started 
applying Japanese law in its place, on the claim that American 
law had simply run out, would be acting without authority. 
Whatever is used to fill those gaps—even the judge’s own dis-
cretion—needs its own legal justification under the rules of our 
legal system. And that justification, if the above argument is 
right, has to be rooted in the Founders’ law. 
b. Addressing the Alternatives 
Whether we adhere to the Founders’ law isn’t a question we 
can answer in isolation. What we really want to know is 
whether this account of our law is better than its competitors. 
Maybe we mostly adhere to the Founders’ law, but also accept a 
few unauthorized changes that came after, such as during Re-
construction or the New Deal. Or maybe we don’t adhere to the 
law of any particular time; maybe we just have commitments to 
individual sources of law, without worrying about when those 
sources emerged. 
i. Multiple Foundings 
One way of rejecting the Founders’ law is to accept particular 
changes that their law didn’t authorize. On one retelling of Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory, for example, the United States has had a se-
ries of legal regimes, like the numbered French Republics. Each 
regime started with an unauthorized change, a “constitutional 
moment” in which the sovereign people altered their law. 
Ackerman claims, for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
wasn’t validly adopted under Article V;199 as we’ve accepted it 
                                                                                                         
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008). On originalism and uncertainty generally, 
see Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Original-
ism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551 (2012); Gary Lawson, Proving 
the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). 
 198. See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 14, 24–28. 
 199. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 36, at 99–119. But see AMAR, 
supra note 108, at 364–80; John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theo-
ry of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE 
L.J. 677, 709–12 (1993); Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the North-
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anyway, this shows that we don’t take the Founders’ law as a cri-
terion for our own. Instead, each new moment (Reconstruction, 
the New Deal, the Civil Rights Era) has served as a new mini-
Founding, requiring ironclad adherence to the law of the current 
regime but not necessarily to anything further back.200 
What should we make of this account? Ackerman’s moments 
were clearly watersheds in American history. But as a positive 
matter, looking to the higher-order legal principles that we 
commonly accept and defend, we don’t really regard them as 
remaking our law, or as marking the start of Second, Third, and 
Fourth Republics. To the armchair sociologist, it seems like most 
people—not just ordinary people, but also lawyers and offi-
cials—categorize these events as lawful changes within a con-
tinuing legal system. Indeed, Ackerman recognizes as much, 
worrying that “[a]lmost everybody” mistakenly “assum[es] that 
the formal text contains the complete constitutional canon.”201 
Maybe Americans only feel this way because they’re igno-
rant of any historical controversy.202 But maybe it’s also because 
our dominant legal explanations of these events, consistent 
with the explanations given at the time, are based on continuity 
rather than disruption. The authors of the Federalist were will-
ing, with a little hemming and hawing, to admit that the Arti-
cles were being violated and to defend the violation as justi-
                                                                                                         
ern Authored Fourteenth Amendment: Reconstruction History (Aug. 28, 2013), http:// 
ssrn.com/id=2317471 [http://perma.cc/V6TZ-GHRG]. 
 200. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 218 (describing 
the 1968 elections as popular ratification of constitutional change); id. at 317 (argu-
ing that judges “do not have the constitutional authority to erase the considered 
judgments of We the People” (emphasis omitted)); ACKERMAN, TRANSFOR-
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 201. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754–55 
(2007); accord ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 36, at 32–33. 
 202. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional 
Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE OF 
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fied.203 By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment’s proponents 
had detailed and well-grounded legal theories as to why the 
ratification process was proper under existing rules. 204  The 
New Dealers didn’t claim to be replacing the original under-
standing with something better, but vindicating the Constitu-
tion from the mistaken readings of the conservative Court.205 
And the Warren Court’s desegregation decisions have long 
been defended as vindicating the actual Fourteenth Amend-
ment from the errors of Plessy v. Ferguson.206 The official story of 
American law, in other words, rejects the idea of more than one 
Founding. The fact that this is the official story, the one from 
which other legal conclusions are usually derived, makes it 
strong evidence of what our law actually requires.207 
Looking beyond the official stories, we can also see these con-
ventions reflected in the attitudes of lawyers and academics. For 
example, there remains a lingering discomfort, and a fair deal of 
scholarship, around any suggestions that the Fourteenth 
Amendment,208 the New Deal,209 or the Civil Rights Era210 depart-
ed from prior rules. These kinds of worries may be unnecessary, 
but they’re almost entirely absent when it comes to, say, our de-
                                                                                                         
 203. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 94, at 279 (noting that “institu-
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partures from British law or from the Articles of Confederation. 
And most importantly, if you go into court in a constitutional case 
and say, “well, Judge, the original Constitution is against us, but 
we superseded it through an informal amendment in 1937,” you 
will lose. That’s an important feature of the American legal system, 
and no serious analysis of our legal practices should ignore it. 
ii. Multiple Sources 
Not every legal system incorporates the law of a particular 
time. Some people reject originalism, not because they prefer 
some later date to the Founding, but because they don’t see our 
legal rules as depending on any date at all. As a matter of social 
fact, we might have assorted commitments to various sources of 
law, without any special regard to when or how those commit-
ments emerged.211 (To borrow a distinction from Robert Nozick, 
these might be called “end-state principles” of law, as opposed to 
“historical principles” that focus on how each rule came to be.)212 
As an example of this kind of source-based theory, suppose 
that U.K. law really did undergo an unauthorized change in 
1966, when the House of Lords claimed a power to overrule 
precedent.213 Maybe, in actual fact, all the changes since then 
have been authorized changes—so that U.K. law today really is 
what it was in 1966, plus lawful changes. But calling the British 
“1966-originalists” would be misleading if no one there cares, 
as a general matter, about 1966 in particular. What U.K. law 
does care about are particular sources of law (statutes, constitu-
tional conventions, common law, etc.), the particular way they 
are right now, which might by happenstance line up with the 
way they were in 1966. 
In the same way, maybe American law relies on certain 
sources (text, precedent, tradition, and so on), the way we accept 
them now, without caring whether they came from the Found-
ing or took shape later on. This kind of theory doesn’t have to be 
nonoriginalist; by coincidence, it might list precisely the same 
sources of law that the Founders recognized. But it’s particularly 
well suited to nonoriginalism, because nonoriginalist theories 
are more plausible if they’re based on a series of familiar sources 
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than on arbitrary commitments to dates like 1966. Maybe we 
treat the Constitution (or longstanding tradition, or stare decisis) 
in a certain way, and we’re more committed to having it our 
way than to whatever the Founders did. 
This is an empirical debate about complex social facts. If we 
accept, all the way down, sources of law that aren’t rooted in the 
Founding, then that’d be a real blow against originalism, at least 
in the form that this Article presents it. But it’s not clear that we 
do accept any doctrines like that, at least not all the way down. 
Consider the way in which we accept the Constitution itself. 
As nonoriginalists have correctly pointed out, it’s possible to ac-
cept a constitutional text in different ways. We could, if we 
chose, use it “as a focal point for legal coordination . . . ; as a flex-
ible framework for common law elaboration; as a locus of nor-
mative discourse in a flourishing constitutional culture; or as one 
of many legitimate ingredients in a pluralist practice of constitu-
tional adjudication.”214 Someone taking one of these views can 
still venerate the text, or share Jack Balkin’s intention to “be 
faithful to the written Constitution as law” and to “accept it as 
our framework for governance”;215 they’d just treat these laws 
and frameworks differently.216 
The originalist response isn’t that these things are impossible 
or absurd (they aren’t), but rather that they’re not what we 
conventionally do. Our standard way of relying on the Consti-
tution’s text is as a binding enactment, not as a locus of dis-
course; we take as our own the legal rules it established until 
those rules are lawfully changed. More importantly, one offi-
cial reason we do this is that it’s what we understand the Con-
stitution to have been designed for: To quote the celebrated line 
from Marbury, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and 
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgot-
ten, the constitution is written.”217 It’s because the Constitution 
was adopted as law, and not just as a set of guidelines or in-
spiring phrases, that we retain it as law today. 
That’s also why, in our practices, those who invoke external 
sources like precedent and tradition typically stress their Found-
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ing-era roots. If all we really cared about were “contemporary 
practices of acceptance,”218 in Fallon’s words, then the Court in 
Noel Canning would have had no reason to waste ink on Found-
ing-era theories of liquidation;219 nor would scholars of stare de-
cisis spend time discussing whether the doctrine was “a central, 
widely accepted feature of our constitutional practice almost 
from the beginning,” 220  whether “founding-era commentators 
generally presupposed that constitutional precedents would be 
treated as authoritative,”221 and so on. But these things do mat-
ter, because our legal rules need good chains of title. If we found 
out tomorrow that stare decisis didn’t exist at the Founding, and 
that it had been invented out of whole cloth by Chief Justice 
Burger,222 that’d surely be concerning to many American law-
yers and academics—in a way that the 1966 practice statement’s 
origins might not matter to British legal culture. 
It’s also important to recognize why a conflict between our 
history and our familiar sources would actually be a conflict in 
the first place. Depending on the history, originalism might 
produce some conclusions that are simply too outlandish for 
the American people to accept. In theory, whether West Virgin-
ia is unconstitutional ultimately comes down to whether the 
Constitution permitted Virginia to be divided in two, which in 
turn depends on the relevance of a particular semicolon in Ar-
ticle IV.223 Maybe it’s true, as a prediction about American soci-
ety, that we’d never get rid of West Virginia—even in the face 
of a knock-down historical argument about semicolons. In-
stead, we’d search very hard for a domesticating doctrine that 
let us keep the state around; and, if all else failed, we’d ignore 
the semicolon and preserve the arrangements we’re used to. 
But the reason why there’s any conflict here, the reason why 
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we’d even need to think about workarounds, is that we already 
and intuitively accept the original rule (whatever it was) as val-
id for us—which is why we might need to alter it to avoid an 
unpleasant consequence. And even if we would depart from the 
Founders’ law if push really came to shove, the fact remains 
that we haven’t done so yet. Our higher-order commitments are 
still tied to the Founding; we haven’t given up on the Found-
ers’ law, even in favor of our familiar legal sources. 
This account of our current law, as reflected in familiar legal 
practices, may or may not sound convincing to you. If it’s 
wrong, then it’s wrong, and our system isn’t fully originalist. 
But even so, our law might still be almost-all-originalist, or 
mostly-originalist, and our dependence on the Founders’ law 
will help show how much and why. Again, the goal of this Ar-
ticle isn’t to prove, once and for all, that our law is originalist. 
Rather, it’s to suggest that our law may well be originalist if—
and precisely to the extent that—we take as our own the Found-
ers’ law, as it’s been lawfully changed. 
III. ORIGINAL-LAW ORIGINALISM 
This Article presents a version of originalism—adherence to 
the Founders’ law—that’s plausibly true as a description of our 
law. One significant side benefit of this version, though, is that 
it may be appealing to those who already consider themselves 
originalists. By moving the focus from interpretation to legal 
change, it helps explain some common originalist intuitions, 
and it may help resolve some of originalism’s intractable in-
tramural debates. 
On this theory, our law today is the Founders’ law, as lawfully 
changed. If that’s right, then the legal rules that the Constitution 
establishes today are the ones it established at the Founding, 
plus any lawful changes. What we’re looking for from the Con-
stitution isn’t really what its text originally said, on our favorite 
theory of interpretation, but what its enactment originally did, as 
a matter of Founding-era law. And to the extent that this legal 
effect depended on what the text meant at the time, then that 
search may well direct us to the text’s original meaning. 
Preserving meaning to preserve the law is a standard move 
among originalists. But a commitment to the Founders’ law has 
much broader implications. Every legal system that uses written 
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texts has some legal rules—let’s call them “interpretive rules”—
for converting those texts into law.224 If we want to know what 
law was established when the original Constitution was adopt-
ed, then we’ll need to use the interpretive rules that were used at 
the time, the ones that were part of the Founders’ law. And we’ll 
need to do the same for each amendment, accounting for any 
lawful changes to the interpretive rules that might have oc-
curred to date. The rules in force at any of these times might 
have been very different from the ones that modern originalists 
support today, or they might not. This is a historical question, 
not one that can be answered with pure theory. 
As a result, this “original-law originalism”—a variant on 
what’s known as “original methods originalism”225—offers re-
sources for recasting, and hopefully resolving, some of the 
longstanding debates among originalists. There are many 
schools of originalists, each emphasizing a different feature of 
texts: authors’ intentions, expected applications, public mean-
ing, and so on. To the extent that they’re making legal claims, 
rather than just normative or conceptual ones, what the differ-
ent schools ought to agree about is contemporary law: the cur-
rent authority of the Founders’ law, the thing that sets them 
apart from the nonoriginalists. By contrast, what originalists 
ought to disagree about is history: which interpretive rules 
were included in the Founders’ law and which (if any) have 
been added since. Those historical questions might be very dif-
ficult, but at least they provide a real subject for disagreement, 
and one on which we might eventually make some progress. 
A. Original Law and Original Meaning 
Suppose that American law today is whatever it was at the 
Founding, plus lawful changes. Some of that Founding-era law 
was the product of the Constitution of 1788, which added a 
number of important rules to the American legal system. Those 
rules remain law today, except as they’ve been lawfully 
changed. So the legal content of the original Constitution to-
day—its contribution to the corpus juris, the difference it 
makes to the general stock of American legal rules—is still the 
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contribution it made at the Founding, plus lawful changes 
since then. And to the extent that this original contribution de-
pended on the original meaning of the text, preserving the law 
will usually involve preserving that meaning too. 
To illustrate, imagine that Article I gave Congress power “to 
regulate the growing of corn.” And assume that in eighteenth-
century America, “corn” was a general term for all cereals (think 
of Britain’s “Corn Laws”), not just maize. Anyone trying to estab-
lish the Founding-era content of U.S. law would conclude, absent 
some special reason not to, that the First Congress had power to 
regulate cereals like wheat and barley. Denying that power to the 
114th Congress today, just because our linguistic practices regard-
ing “corn” have changed over time, would be a change to our le-
gal rules. And if we want to preserve the Founders’ legal rules, 
we’ll ordinarily need to preserve the meaning of their language. 
This is an intuitive feature of originalism, and one that many 
other scholars have recognized.226 As Marbury asked, “To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limita-
tion committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be 
passed by those intended to be restrained?”227 Preserving the 
limits is the important part; the writing is there only to help en-
sure that the limits aren’t “mistaken, or forgotten,” over time.228 
But relatively few scholars have considered the full implications 
of this approach—preferring to support their interpretive theories 
on normative or conceptual grounds. As noted above, what the 
law is and what it ought to be are different; whatever might be the 
normatively best or philosophically correct way of doing things, a 
legal system might, as a matter of social fact, have a practice of 
doing something else. The intuition behind original-law original-
ism is that the law may have taken a position on which interpre-
tive rules apply—and, if it did, those rules ought to control. 
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1. Interpretation and Legal Rules 
The idea of legal rules that govern interpretation may sound 
strange at first. Don’t we just figure out the right way to read a 
legal text, and then do whatever it says? The problem is that 
what an enactment says (its communicative content) and what 
it legally obliges us to do (its legal content) aren’t really the 
same thing. There’s a great deal to be said on this topic,229 but a 
brief discussion should suffice. 
When we talk about the “meaning” of a legal instrument (a 
contract, will, statute, etc.), we’re often referring instead to its le-
gal content: the particular assignment of rights, liabilities, respon-
sibilities, and so on, that it endorses or makes part of the law.230 
As Raz notes, legal instruments needn’t be written in these 
Hohfeldian terms.231 We just need to be able to understand, after 
some analysis, the rules that they endorse.232 (Think of the com-
plex legal implications of a will reading, “All to wife.”233) 
Often this analysis depends on other legal rules. As Endicott 
writes, “the law itself has techniques for determining the effect 
of [a] normative text.”234 Standard examples include the Dic-
tionary Act, the repeal-revival rule, or the general savings stat-
ute.235 People might disagree about the role of these statutes in 
our legal system,236 but it’s surely possible for a legal system to 
have legal rules that determine the effect of texts. Consider the 
familiar canon that the specific controls the general.237 The only 
role of this canon is to change the outcome in cases that already 
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fall within the meaning of a newer, more general statute. For 
instance, Title VII gives a cause of action to anyone who meets 
certain criteria, but a person meeting all those criteria can still 
be barred from suit by a 200-year-old statute about claim pre-
clusion.238 The problem here isn’t that the plaintiff falls outside 
the meaning of Title VII; he doesn’t, or else he’d have lost on 
some other ground already. The problem is that he falls inside 
the meaning of some other statute too, and we need a legal 
rule—not just knowledge of the meaning of texts—to tell us 
what to do when the two conflict. 
If we’re interested in the Constitution’s original legal content, 
and not just its original meaning, then we have to determine 
that content by processing the text through whatever legal 
rules were operative at the time. By way of analogy, consider 
what happens when we create a legal text today. As a text, as 
marks on paper, it could have a variety of meanings; we could 
read it as a proposal, parody, or prose poem, as a statement of 
our civic identity or a personal source of inspiration, and so 
on.239 But when determining its legal content—the change it 
works in the law, its contribution to the general stock of Amer-
ican legal rules—we look to our legal rules of interpretation, 
our process of taking texts and turning them into law. 
Those rules might take any of a number of strategies. They 
might incorporate by reference the best philosophical theory of 
meaning and leave it at that. They might incorporate the lin-
guistic conventions of English, or legalese, or medieval law 
French. They might incorporate the nonlegal customs of offi-
cials, things that are useful guides to official practice but that 
we don’t regard as part of the law. (Such as writing exclusive 
lists, a custom that justifies a presumption of expressio unius but 
that doesn’t carry the force of law.) Or they might include spe-
cifically legal rules, such as governing statutes, specific com-
mon-law doctrines,240 or unwritten interpretive principles (such 
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as the relative authority of text and purpose241 or the validity of 
liquidating meaning over time242). 
The idea of determining an enactment’s legal effect by “rules” 
might suggest too neat a picture. This Article uses “rule” in a 
very broad sense,243 and it’s silly to think that American law ever 
offered—at the Founding or today—an off-the-shelf algorithm 
for mechanically converting language into law. But there are still 
better and worse ways to get legal content out of particular writ-
ten instruments. Delegates at Philadelphia got into plenty of 
fights, and lobbyists today spend plenty of money, to influence 
the language of legal instruments; that’d all be pointless without 
some reliable means of converting those texts into legal rules. 
The point here is merely that whatever methods are prescribed 
in the law, those are the ones we are supposed to use. Failing to 
use them would be a legal error, and it might produce mistaken 
judgments about what an enactment does to the law. 
One easy way to use the wrong rules is to pick them from the 
wrong time period. If we want to know how a new enactment 
affects today’s law, we have to consult today’s interpretive rules. 
If we want to know how the enactment of the Constitution’s text 
affected the law at the Founding, we have to consult the inter-
pretive rules that were around back then. Using anachronistic 
rules designed for modern enactments would mislead us as to 
the state of the law at the time, just like using anachronistic rules 
of language to read the word “corn.” And if we want to know 
what, say, the Sixteenth Amendment did to the law, we need to 
consult the interpretive rules that were around when it was 
adopted in 1913—including the external standards, like the Eng-
lish usage of the time, that those interpretive rules may have in-
corporated by reference. We look to the original interpretive 
rules, because those are what generated the original law. 
2. The Substance of Interpretive Rules 
Original-law originalism is all about procedure, not sub-
stance. On its own, the theory doesn’t say anything about what 
                                                                                                         
 241. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 
371–72 (1992). 
 242. See Sachs, supra note 110, at 1806–08; supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 18. 
880 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
 
the content of the original interpretive rules might have been. 
That’s an empirical question; we have to look and see. 
Once we’ve done our historical inquiries, the answers might 
well surprise us. Maybe the Founders really did choose “lan-
guage capable of growth,”244 or the Constitution’s legal content 
really was supposed to evolve along with changes in our lan-
guage (giving “corn” a new meaning in every new era). Many 
ostensible nonoriginalists—including, for instance, Justice Brey-
er—base their claims about legal sources or interpretive methods 
on Founding-era evidence.245 To the extent that they accept that 
history controls, but think that it points in a different direction 
than modern originalists do, we have an ordinary historical dis-
agreement, which we ought to solve on empirical grounds. 
Originalists should be happy to fight on those grounds and to 
welcome such claims into the “originalist” tent. Again, if some-
one’s basis for taking a “nonoriginalist” view (that America has 
a common-law constitution, 246  that we experience occasional 
moments of higher lawmaking,247 that a variety of traditional 
sources and interpretive approaches should apply248) is that so it 
was laid down in 1788, why shouldn’t we call these views 
“originalist” instead? Everything still depends on the history: If 
it turns out that the Founders didn’t have a common-law consti-
tution, or didn’t choose language capable of growth, and so on, 
then these views would have to be revised. 
Currently, when people describe the commitments necessary to 
be an originalist, they often make unstated assumptions about the 
history. On Lawrence Solum’s famous formulation of originalism, 
with which “most or almost all originalists agree,” the original 
meaning of a constitutional provision “was fixed or determined at 
the time” it was adopted (the “fixation thesis”),249 and this original 
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meaning “should make a substantial contribution to the content of 
constitutional doctrine” (the “contribution thesis”).250 To an origi-
nal-law originalist, these claims are contingent, not essential to the 
project. If the Founders’ interpretive rules did require the law to 
update along with every change in language, then it’s just not true 
that the original meaning of the original Constitution has any sub-
stantial contribution to make. 
Of course, while some academics approve that kind of up-
dating,251 it’s doubtful that any actual society ever has. Changes 
in language usually happen for reasons having nothing to do 
with the law (e.g., “corn”), and they might upset all the reasons 
the enactors had for choosing some words over others. In par-
ticular, there’s little evidence that the Founders’ law functioned 
this way. Madison, for example, dismissed the idea outright: 
If the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable mean-
ing of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape 
and attributes of the government must partake of the chang-
es to which the words and phrases of all living languages 
are constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be 
produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology 
were to be taken in its modern sense!252 
3. What Originalists Can Disagree About 
At this point, we can see the way to common ground for 
originalists of different schools. Originalists can agree—or 
ought to—that we adhere to the Founders’ law, as lawfully 
changed. What they might disagree about is the historical con-
tent of that law (including its interpretive rules) or how we’ve 
changed it since. 
In fact, each school might benefit from recasting its arguments 
in terms of the original law. Original-intentions scholars have 
already started doing this, arguing that if we endow a particular 
group with authority to make law for us (Framers, Ratifiers, 
etc.), we should look for the law that they wanted to make.253 If 
the Constitution trumps all other sources of law, why let inter-
pretive rules trump the people who get to write the Constitution, 
                                                                                                         
 250. Solum, supra note 4, at 35 (emphasis omitted). 
 251. See sources cited supra note 46. 
 252. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LETTERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 441, 442 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867). 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
882 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 38 
 
and so to make any rules they want? The reason, on the original-
law approach, is that the Framers or Ratifiers might not have 
had this kind of untrammeled authority at the Founding. Maybe 
their commission wasn’t to make the law so much as to produce a 
text, which would then be turned into law through the existing 
interpretive rules. (One reason for this kind of limited commis-
sion is that we can’t read their minds to find out the law they 
made;254 we can only read their texts, and so we might need in-
terpretive rules to help us along.) Either way, we need to know 
the answer to this question of authority before we can say 
whether the authors’ intentions always control. 
A similar approach applies to “public meaning” originalists, 
who emphasize what an actual member of the public255—or, 
perhaps, a “reasonable person” of that place and time256—
would have thought the document meant. If the relevant read-
er is already familiar with the entire corpus juris, including all 
applicable interpretive rules, then “public meaning” may just 
collapse into original law. If not, then presumably we have 
some reason for depriving them of that knowledge—for in-
stance, a view that “[t]he Constitution was written to be under-
stood by the voters.”257 But that too is a claim about Founding-
era interpretive rules, one that might be true or false and that 
remains hotly debated.258 If the law at the Founding attributed 
a different legal content to the Constitution than what the ordi-
nary voter understood (say, the understandings of the dele-
gates they elected), that might pose a problem of democratic 
theory or legitimacy, but not a problem of law. 
Of all the popular interpretive methods, the original-law ap-
proach most closely resembles what’s known as “original meth-
ods” originalism,259 which generally tries to use the interpretive 
methods that would have been used by the Founders. In fact, 
perhaps the only real difference between the two is how they 
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decide which Founders’ methods to follow. For example, sup-
pose that the lay reader of the Constitution would have used 
method A, but a technically educated elite reader would have 
used method B. 260  Different versions of “original methods” 
might use different means to choose among them. On an origi-
nal-law approach, though, this would be a question for jurispru-
dence to answer: Does the best positivist theory identify law 
through the conventions of ordinary people, or through the 
practices of lawyers, judges, and officials? Whose rules actually 
constituted the law of the Republic? To the extent that we want 
to use this text as a ground for legal conclusions today, we need 
to start by determining its role in the Founders’ law. 
B. Addressing Objections 
To the uninitiated, all this might sound like splitting hairs—or 
worse, like angels dancing on the head of a pin. An original-law 
approach assumes that the Founders had a full set of interpretive 
rules ready to go, and that these rules were part of American law, 
not just the laws of individual states.261 But given how much peo-
ple disagreed back then, was there really any law to apply?262 And 
if we’re not sure about the interpretive rules, and if the theory is 
such a big tent, won’t its flexibility and theoretical abstraction take 
away the predictability and constraint that originalism promised 
to deliver? These objections are important, but ultimately not ef-
fective. There was law to apply at the Founding, and this law itself 
provides the only kind of constraint we need. 
1. Was There Any Law? 
The Founding was a time of extraordinary ferment, when 
Americans were deeply divided on first principles of law and 
politics. In particular, they disagreed about how to interpret the 
                                                                                                         
 260. Cf. Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popu-
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Constitution.263 Was this new document more like a statute, a 
state constitution, or a treaty that binds sovereign states? 
Should it be construed broadly to achieve its objects, or strictly 
to protect the contracting parties? We, today, shouldn’t be sur-
prised by this kind of disagreement—nor should we expect 
people back then to have agreed any more than we do.264 
But that disagreement doesn’t leave us at sea. For one thing, 
if we still adhere to the Founders’ law, their disagreements are 
the ones that matter. If some questions were well settled at the 
time and only became confusing later on (say, due to obscuring 
changes in language), recovering original history can help 
solve questions rather than raise them. 
For another, disagreement is just the start of an inquiry, not 
the end. When we disagree on legal questions, we don’t always 
conclude that they lack a right answer; we each have opinions 
on which answers make the most sense to us, and we usually 
manage to muddle through. The same may be true of the 
Founding. The evidence cited by Jefferson Powell, for example, 
suggests that early interpretive practice was dominated by 
common-law methods of statutory interpretation, and that the 
treaty analogy gained particular prominence only after the Vir-
ginia and Kentucky Resolutions.265 If that’s right, then we may 
be able to resolve a number of interpretive questions well 
enough, even if the Founders lacked an absolute consensus. 
Maybe evidence of radical and thoroughgoing disagreement 
at the Founding, of the kind that wholly undermines the social 
conventions giving rise to legal rules, would make the original-
law project impossible. Law is a matter of social fact, and some 
societies simply lack the features necessary to generate legal an-
swers at a given time. (When, during the Revolution, did British 
law really lose force on the ground?) But however chaotic the 
Founding was, there wasn’t that much disagreement. Even be-
fore the Constitution’s adoption, the United States of America 
was an independent confederated state, with a functioning gov-
ernment, officials, and courts. The Confederation might have 
functioned poorly, given the Articles’ many defects; but it exist-
ed, and it both generated and was governed by legal rules. It’s 
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hard to say the disagreements at the Founding were so funda-
mental as to eliminate the possibility of operative law. 
In the same way, the existence of the United States as a real 
live government before the Constitution suggests that there 
were some interpretive rules around too. After all, the legal 
system had to have some means of interpreting enactments like 
the Articles or the various ordinances of the Confederation 
Congress. The thirteen states all shared the English common-
law tradition, and they all relied on common-law principles as 
the natural background against which to read Congress’s en-
actments. Indeed, the very fact that people argued over which 
interpretive model to use—statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.—
shows that they assumed some degree of consensus as to the 
rules that would properly govern in each case. 
2. The Founders’ Law and Constraint 
A practicing lawyer, reading about the disputing schools of 
originalism, might be forgiven for wondering what relevance all 
this could have to the law. The first modern originalists were 
easy to understand: They wanted to constrain judges, in reaction 
to what they saw as a wild-and-crazy Warren Court.266 Since 
then, constraint has become less important to “new originalism,” 
but it still plays a role in common intuitions about originalist 
theory.267 Original-law originalism, though, seems to blow con-
straint out of the water. History aside, the theory is potentially 
compatible with a bizarre variety of methods, from Bork to 
Breyer to Strauss. If we have to go through all this complicated 
theoretical apparatus, and we still don’t know the answers when 
we’re done, what good is it to originalism? 
Part of the answer turns on the difference between theory and 
practice. 268  A practicing lawyer, reading about the disputing 
schools of originalists, might feel like a short-order cook being 
lectured about organic chemistry: “Sure, at some level this might 
help explain what I do, but hopefully not very often.” On most 
ordinary questions, the range of plausible theories about our 
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law—including the Founders’ law—will be relatively narrow, in 
which case the theory won’t do much harm to constraint. 
Where it does make a difference, though, the theory may 
provide a better kind of constraint than the early modern 
originalists had in mind. One longstanding problem with “con-
straint”—as others have pointed out before—is that it can be 
achieved in many different ways, most of which look nothing 
at all like originalism. Any number of procedures can restrict 
judges’ decisions: flip a coin, always rule for the defendant, al-
ways follow your party’s political preferences,269 always follow 
the original meaning of the French Constitution (or the U.S. 
Constitution with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
moved), and so on. If the only goal is to produce determinate 
results, there’s no reason to pick originalism in particular. And 
the Constitution’s original meaning might itself license judicial 
discretion—or, even worse, the sheer difficulty of recovering its 
meaning may let judges call any result “originalist.”270 
But a focus on the Founders’ law helps explain the intuitive 
connection between originalism and constraint. The problem 
with coin-flipping or the French Constitution isn’t that they 
impose few constraints on judges; they might be rather de-
manding in practice. The problem is that the choice of constraint 
is so unconstrained. We have no good explanation, from the 
perspective of constraint alone, why judges should follow the 
Constitution’s original meaning as opposed to any other set of 
equally determinate rules, so long as all of them use the same 
ones. Adherence to the Founders’ law provides that explana-
tion, because the source of constraint is the law, whatever that 
might be. 
Judges, like all government officials, have to act according to 
law. Sometimes the law provides determinate rules, sometimes 
flexible standards (like “neglect”); each has its own costs and 
benefits, and we use them each in different ways.271 If the law 
happens to give the judges plenty of room to play fast-and-
loose, that’s our fault, not the judge’s fault. Following the law is 
what judges are supposed to do. 
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Original-law originalism imposes few substantive require-
ments on the law; it leaves a great deal up to history. Perhaps, as 
a policy matter, it’d allow judges to get away with too much.272 
But the method stands or falls, not by whether it limits judicial 
creativity, but whether it’s an accurate statement of our law. 
And, in some ways, that’s the most important constraint of all. 
IV. ORIGINALISM AND HISTORY 
Original-law originalism is extremely demanding from a his-
torical perspective. There’s an awful lot we need to know. At 
the same time, though, it suggests new ways of resolving ongo-
ing debates between historians and lawyers. 
One of the common complaints about originalism is that it 
forces lawyers and judges to “play historian,” to learn a great 
deal about matters (the Founders’ beliefs, political experience, 
or linguistic practice) in which they lack real expertise. This is 
perfectly fair, as far as it goes. Originalism requires a great deal 
of historical knowledge, and the research producing that 
knowledge ought to be done well. 
But if originalism is really based on the Founders’ law, rather 
than the meaning of a particular eighteenth-century text, then 
the lawyers aren’t really treading on anyone’s turf. Instead, 
they’re doing something eminently legal: determining what 
U.S. law was as of a particular date. That’s obviously a job for 
lawyers, albeit with the benefit of historians’ help.273 
Moreover, it’s the kind of job that lawyers perform all the time. 
Nemo dat might require us to figure out whether A or B owned 
Blackacre long ago.274 State border disputes can turn on the proper 
construction of an old interstate compact or the Crown grant to 
Lord Baltimore.275 Ex post facto claims force courts to determine 
what the law was when a crime was committed, not what it is to-
day.276 And so on. We have domesticating doctrines like adverse 
possession to help us avoid difficult inquiries into the past; but we 
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only have them because inquiry into the past would otherwise be a 
normal part of our legal reasoning. 
Viewing historical inquiry as just one component of ordinary 
legal practice also helps answer the criticism that originalism, 
and particularly original-law originalism, is just too difficult to 
carry out.277 Finding out the standard interpretive methods in a 
legal system at a certain time isn’t any harder, in the abstract, 
than comprehending a term of art in a contemporary trade;278 
both require knowledge of conventions that are broadly held 
and at the same time potentially contested. (Indeed, translators 
of historical documents do this work all the time.) We read texts 
for their obvious signification, and if someone wants to argue 
that we’re doing it wrong, we wait for them to do so persua-
sively. In the meantime, we do what seems right on the evi-
dence we have. 
And in any case, this might just be what our law requires. 
Understanding originalism as a legal project, rather than a 
primarily historical one, doesn’t let us avoid the historical re-
search by focusing on lawyers’ questions. Rather, it shows why 
the historical issues are lawyers’ questions. We try all the time 
to answer questions of the form, “what was the law on topic X 
as of date Y?” That’s precisely what originalism does, for good 
or ill. And it’s also precisely what we do, albeit with a broader 
universe of legal materials, when we answer questions of the 
form, “what is the law on topic X today?”—questions that law-
yers ought to be able to answer, if anyone can. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalism as adherence to the Founders’ law is complicat-
ed and simple at the same time. It’s extremely complicated, be-
cause we have to know the content of the Founders’ law in its 
full glory—interpretive rules, context, rules of change, and so 
on. But it’s also very simple, because it makes the basis for 
originalism very easy to understand: our law stays the same 
until it’s lawfully changed. That ought to be the originalist’s 
slogan, because originalism is a theory of legal change. 
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